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An abstract of a thesis entitled
PUBLIC RELATIONS IN ALLIED
NAVAL OPERATIONS AND EXERCISES
David W. Garrett
Boston University
School of Public Communication
Division of Public Relations
August 1965
The United States is currently involved in more than forty
mutual defense alliances with nations throughout the world. These
alliances depend upon mutual understanding and cooperation for effect-
ive strength to combat the Communist threat. Allied naval operations
and exercises are conducted for the purpose of achieving operational
objectives and gaining public support for all participating nations.
To increase understanding between allied nations and to gain
public support for allied exercises, it is mandatory to practice
effective public relations. In allied naval exercises, the organ-
ization entrusted with the public relations functions is known as the
Command Information Bureau.
A Command Information Bureau requires careful planning and
consideration for the viewpoints of all participating nations. If
the public relations aspects of an exercise are poorly conducted,
misunderstanding and distrust result.

This study is concerned with the organization, operation, and
responsibilities of the Command Information Bureau in allied naval
exercises. Particular attention is paid to cross-cultural complications
and international media relationships. Specific recommendations are
formulated for the guidance of Naval public relations personnel who
may participate in future allied operations.

INTRODUCTION
After World War II, the United States entered into many region-
al defense organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
and the South-East Asia Treaty Organization,, Additionally, the United
States entered into bilateral defense arrangements with many other
nations o Today, the United States is committed to help protect
forty-two allies on four continents,, The foremost objective of these
organizations is the defense of the free world against Communist
aggression.
Because of these mutual defense arrangements, the United
States' defense establishment was obligated to think in terms of an
allied defense posture rather than in terms of autonomous policy and
procedure*, The American political and military leaders, wary of the
United States' history of isolation and conscious of Europe's depend-
ence upon American intervention in two wars, believed that these
alliances were essential to make America* s commitment (to come to the
defense of the free world) convincing to the potential aggressor and
to the potential victims of aggression as wello W» W c Rostow, in
his study of the United States foreign policy, best describes the
situations
Like the nation, the military were thus dragged slowly from
1
Robert Endicott Osgood, NATO. The Entangling A]
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p 25o

isolationism by the march of events in the face of a succession
of palpable crises, for each of which the degree of prior pre-
paration proved grossly inadequate This lack of preparation
extended from the ruling concepts of the national interest,
through war-planning , the state of military technology, to a
grossly inadequate order of battle,
2
International public relations could easily be included in this summary.
To the United States Navy, international public relations was
not exactly new but past experience had been limited primarily to
goodwill visits* In the goodwill visit, the Navy mainly conducted
a public relations "show". The foreign public was shown just what
the United States desired it to see. The new regional and bilateral
defense organizations added another dimension to the area of inter-
national public relations*
In allied exercises at sea, the U oS Navy is judged in com-
parison with other participating forces. It is scrutinized from the
view point of what it, and the United States, can contribute to the
defense of the free world. The United States 2 aims are examined to
ascertain if they are unilateral in scope or in the interest of mutual
defense. There is no longer a "planned tour"; during "at-seaM
exercises, the foreign public, through media representatives and
official observers, is shown how the U S, Navy operates and how well
it cooperates with other forces.
An allied naval operation can achieve meaningful operational
objectives and contribute greatly to the military strength of the
2
Wo W, Rostow, The United States in the World Arena (New York?
Harper and Row, 1960), p, 37-38,

3participating nations. Through effective public relations, an op-
eration can win new friendships and strengthen old ones by encouraging
mutual understanding and cooperation It can damage the strength of
the free world if , through badly handled public relations, it creates
ill will and drives a wedge between the participating forces and
nations. Additionally, the success of the operation will be lacking
if it does not receive notice and the military forces do not receive
•a
appropriate credit from the news media of the participating nations.
Admiral John A, Tyree, Commander of U.S. Task Force 86 (Oper-
ations UNITAS IV, 1963), opened with the following statement at each
of his press conferences in the countries visited during a joint
U.S. -South American operation:
These exercises improve our ability to work together using
common doctrines, common tactics, common techniques and common
communications* But probably the most important benefit is the
mutual understanding and respect which is developed between
our personnel.4
In the operational field of allied operations, uniform pro-
cedures and doctrines have been established. There has been research
into, and the adoption of, standardized practices. Allied tactical
and strategic publications have been in use for years.
3
Robert S. Jones ( CDR,USN) , " Command Information Bureau in
Allied Operations", (unpublished paper in the files of the Office of
Information, Navy Department, Washington, D.C. - undated and mimeo-
graphed), p. 1.
A
Jack C. McDermott, "Report of Operation UNITAS IV" (unpublish-
ed report by Public Relations Advisor - USIA. In the files of the
Office of Information, Navy Department, Washington, D.C. , 1963 - mimeo-
graphed), p. 1.

In the international public relations field, however, there
has been no research, little experience, and very little in the form
of directives for guidance in allied operations*.
Rear Admiral W» P, Mack, Chief of Information - Navy Department,
realizes the great need for a detailed study of public relations in
allied operations. In his letter of 4 January 1965, Admiral Mack
strongly recommended that the area of "Public Relations during Allied
Operations" be considered as a thesis topic by one of the naval
officers attending Boston University Graduate School, He stressed
that such a study would contribute greatly to the conduct of Navy
public relations.
In order to have a properly planned and executed public relations
program during allied operations, an organization must be established
for the conduct and coordination of public information In the Navy,
this organization is known as the Command Information Burea,
The use of the Command Information Bureau in international
operations is of recent origin. The addition of international members
in the Command Information Bureau and the participation of foreign
forces in the operation have created unique problems which require
special solutions. If these problems are not correctly solved, they
may adversely affect world understanding and cooperation for mutual
defense.
Letter from Rear Admiral W, P, Mack, USN, Chief of Information




5This study is an analysis of U S. Naval public relations con-
cerned with allied operations and exercises. The first segment dis-
cusses the general nature of regional and bilateral defense organ-
izations and the Navy's role in diplomacy and foreign policy. The
second part of the study concentrates on specific aspects of oper-
ating a Command Information Bureau An analysis of major areas of
allied operations - NATO, SEATO, and Pan-American alliances - is
included in the second segmento The last section is concerned with
specific recommendations for Naval public relations and suggested
improvements for international understanding in allied operations*
In order to arrive at specific conclusions on which to base
a guideline for public relations improvement, the following methods
of investigation were pursued!
(a) Library research at Boston University, Harvard University,
and the Boston Public Library.
(b) Personal interviews with?
1. Chief of Information, Navy Department, Washington, D C
2. Deputy Chief of Information, Navy Department,
Washington, D.C.
3. Special Assistant to Deputy Chief of Information, Navy
Department, Washington, D C
4.0 Director of Media Relations Division, Office of
Information, Navy Department, Washington, D«C
5. Assistant for Public Information, First Naval District,
Boston, Massachusetts.

6(c) A survey of current allied information procedures including
opinions, suggestions, recommendations , Command Information
Bureau operations orders, and reports of operations from
the following sources:
1 o Commander Sixth Fleet
2. Commander in Chief, U S Naval Forces Europe
3. Commander in Chief, U„S Pacific Fleet
4» Commander Seventh Fleet
5« Commander, U S„ Naval Forces, Japan
6 Commander, U.S„ Naval Forces, Philippines
7. Commander in Chief, Pacific
8. Commander, U«S Taiwan Defense Command
9«> Headquarters, Military Assistance Command, Viet-Nam
10<, Commander in Chief, UN Command/Commander, U„S Forces,
Korea
11 o Headquarters, U S European Command
12» Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe
13» Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic
14» Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Mediterranean
(d) Questionnaire survey within the above listed commands to de-
termine the professional background of the information offi-
cers assigned - public relations training, experience, and
language ability, (Unfortunately, no general conclusions or
specific statistical data could be gathered due to the small
percentage of returns).

7(e) A study of Command Information Bureau reports on file in the
Office of Information, Navy Department, Washington, D„C
(f) A survey of allied naval literature at the Naval War College,
Newport, Rhode Island,,
Two years' personal experience aboard the U„S„So Springfield
( CLG 7) , flagship of Commander, Sixth Fleet (Mediterranean) , afforded
this student many opportunities to observe NATO operations at first
hando This experience, coupled with an academic year at the School
of Public Communication, proved to be a valuable aid in analyzing




In the pursuit of international relations, each state is
primarily concerned with those internal , national interests it con-
ceives to be of paramount significance » The management of external
affairs must harmonize and supplement the internal policies and
programs of the governmento The goals of government may be the
promotion of commerce and trade, the acquisition of territory, or the
maintenance of peace and security Whatever these goals may be, there
must be a convergent, cohesive quality that permits rational inter-
mingling with international objectives,,
The nature of international diplomacy therefore depends upon
the society and its particular mores In a totalitarian society, the
successful diplomat must be crafty and approach arch-conspiracy* In
a commercial society, he must understand international finance, commercej
and trade The effective diplomat may sometimes induce with gifts,
as did some of our emissaries negotiating with the Indians or native
Pacific peoples, or he may make a show of force as did Commodore Perry
in Japan,, Recent times have demonstrated that the combination of




Elmer Plischke, Conduct of American. Diplomacy (New Xorks Van
Nostrand, 1950), p 15»

9What are the general methods or techniques that nations use to
obtain their objectives? Historically,, war itself has been the ultimate
method of achieving objective
s
a Nations have elected to rely upon
coercion or the threat of force in which case military strength and
the disposition and use of armed forces was of primary importance,.
Recently,, however, the cost of recourse to war has been so overwhelming,
that a wise government is usually willing to accept a reasonable com-
promise* In this manner j fundamental objectives are achieved by such
2
means as discussion, inducement , and conciliation
The study 9 Training of Specialists in International Relations
,
suggests five methods in which nations achieve international objectives
These five methods ares (1) diplomacy; (2) propaganda: (3) economic
inducements and pressures; (4) international organizations and other
3
multilateral arrangements; (5) military threats and ware
Recently, the principal foreign policy assistant to the President
of the United States, McGeorge Bundy, outlined his gmide to United States
foreign policy He said that four "realities" must guide U S foreign
policy - the exercise of military power, use of the United Nations,
foreign aid, and knowledge of the nature and threat of communism* "The
danger to us when we're in the heat of debate is that one or the others
4






C Dale Fuller, Training of Specialists in International
ftglatlQttS (Washington? American Council on Education, 1957), p<> 3<
4
The Boston Globe. June 16, 1965, p<> 1„
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At the present time, the United States appears to be using all
of these "realities" to achieve its international objectives. Short
of all-out war, there are demonstrations of military power, such as
sending the nuclear fleet on a world tour, public displays of space
achievement, announcing the development of new weapons, and mobilizing
the nation's defense forces for action in Viet-Nam All these devices
and others are being used as foreign policy maneuvers
In order to better understand how the United States arrived at
this present foreign policy, it is helpful to glance at the past
developments that led to complete entanglement in world affairs,,
From Isolation to Entanglement
The United States became a world power at the turn of the
century. At this time, the nation should have embarked on an all-
out program of diplomacy. But, by virtue of isolation policy and non-
acceptance of world political responsibility, any attempt at full-scale
diplomacy was postponed. Even when the United States realized that it
was a major world power (politically and militarily) during World
War I, there was further diplomatic procrastination by returning to
isolationism following the War, Although President Wilson tried in
vain to end this isolation policy with his Fourteen Points and League
of Nations, the nation was not ready to accept global responsibility.
It was ironic that the first of the Fourteen Points read: "Open
covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no




proceed always frankly and in the public view*"
The decision of the United States to give up isolation and to
intervene in world affairs came as World War II was coining to a close.
This great decision to give up isolation, which had been the American
creed since the Republic was born v) was an awesome step into the unknown,.
Yet, the statesmen and the American people finally recognized that the
vital interests of the United States extended beyond the national
borders in all directions of the globe
There never was much doubt , as World War II was coming to its
close , that the United States was through with isolation and
would take a large share of responsibility in the affairs of the
world* President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull and their advisers
were worried in 194-5 lest there be a repetition of America's
rejection of responsibility such as had taken place after World
War I j but this proved to be an abundance of caution,. The
United Nations Charter which was prepared at the San Francisco
Conference in the spring of 194-5 was approved in the United
States Senate by an overwhelming vote and our country was off
on its new career of intervention,,"
Thus, the United States was a full-fledged participant in
the establishment of major international organizations during World
War II and the postwar years • The wartime agencies were joined out
of practical necessity because the United States had become an integral
member and ranking leader among her wartime allies There was full
participation in nearly all postwar international organizations of a
general or specialized character including the United Nations , its
affiliates, the International Court of Justice, and the Organization




Thomas K Finletter, Foreign Policvs The Next Phase - The
1960 8 s (New York* Frederick A Praeger, 1960), p« llo

12
to control the defeated enemy states fully bound the United States to
7
other nationso
It is interesting to note that President Truman's inaugural
address in January 194-9 was devoted entirely to the subject of foreign
relationso This was the first such address in the country 8 s history
to emphasize solely international objectives,,
Along with the building of many alliances went the rebuilding
of the United States 8 military power» The country had demobilized to
a low level right after World War II
,
just as had been done at the end
of the first World War» Even after Russia and China began to show
their real colors, the nation kept on demobilizing,. Later, in 1950,
when the Korean conflict came along, the military situation changed,.
The budget for the armed services jumped from about $14- billion in
1950 to about $60 billion in 1952» It was realized that it is not
just at home that situations of strength are needed; that the many
alliances that had been created called for a strong military force
in peacetime,. Now there is a fixed national policy that the opposition
8
had best not be underestimated
Through the fifties it became apparent that the United States
had assumed its responsibilities as a great power and had beyond a
doubt become a "joiner" in the field of international organization,,
The idea of interdependence among nations was clearly stressed in




Finletter, p„ 13, 75<

13
President Eisenhower issued this joint communiques
The arrangements which the nations of the free world have made
for collective defense and mutual help are based on the recog-
nition that the concept of national self-sufficiency is out of
date The countries of the free world are interdependent, and
only in genuine partnership, by combining their resources and
sharing tasks in many fields, can progress and safety be found
For our part, we have agreed that our two countries will hence-
forth act in accordance with this principle c9
As previously stated, the United States is currently committed
to help protect forty allies through such organizations as NATO,
SEATO, CENTO, and the mutual defense treaties with South Korea, Taiwan,
and Japan., America's position, as the center of a web of alliances
and as the mainstay of the Communist containment policy, forces her
to adopt a counter-force strategy of tremendous proportions involving
every faofct of political and military diplomacy,.
Yet, today, Americans deep involvement in waging the Cold War
contains one striking irony<> The formerly isolationist United States,
by virtue of preponderant power, feels more directly involved in the
practical tasks of the power conflict than many of her allies, who are
tempted to view this conflict with something of the disdain, aloofness,
and escapism with which Americans once viewed the Old Worldo As a
result p many of these alliances suffer from an imbalance of burdens
and responsibilities, which limits a rational response to the objective
10
needs of security and the subjective needs of cohesion,,
9
Alastair Buchan, NATO in the 1960°
s
(New York? Frederick A«
Praeger, 1963), p» 59«
10
Robert Endicott Osgood, NATO,, the Entangling Alliance
( Chicago s University of Chicago Press, 1962), p„ 353o

uPolitical and Military Interdependence
Most of the United States 8 alliances were born of World War II
and the Korean conflict There seems to be a rule that as the wars
recede in time and the sense of danger which brought the allies together
fades,, the members tend more often to go their separate ways As the
need for a strong alliance increases with the passage of time, allies
often understand the need less and less<>
This tendency can be explained partially by the fact that
countries have not figured out how to concert their policies for the
world outside of a certain alliance in such a way as not to damage
their solidarity within the alliance Experience has shown that a
nation cannot be multilateral in the Atlantic and go-it-alone in
11
Asia and the rest of the worldo
The majority of the United States 5 alliances are based on
mutual defense arrangements<> So it is not surprising to find the
most efforts directed toward weapons, strategy, and military budgets
For example, the fifteen NATO powers spend nearly $70 billion on
defense each year, of which probably some $50 billion is directly
concerned with the defense of Europe and the NATO area e And it is
this near obsession with military matters that often causes the over-
looking of political implications,. There has been no grand realization






In foreign affairs,, diplomatic strength and success are more
likely than not supported and influenced by military strength,, The
need for an extremely capable diplomatic corps is imperative. However,
there remains the fact that less capable diplomats may exert substantial
influence if supported by strong military strengths, The two are
12
complementary and inseparable
Conversely, alliance military staffs must be reminded that
"the field of purely military planning or of purely military con-
siderations is diminishing all the time, and cannot be considered -
if it ever could - in a political and economic vacuum without doing
13
grave damage to the objectives of the alliance"
„
Robert E Osgood, in his study of NATO, effectively sets
down the complications of military policies and statecraft*
The ultimate rationale of military strategy
,
properly understood,
has always been its support of the political purposes of a nation,
but the exacting requirements of contemporary deterence have made
the relationship between force and policy both intimate and more
intricate. Efficacious military plans - especially those relating
to the development, deployment, command and control, and use of
1 nuclear weapons - now depend upon the most systematic calculation
of their psychological impact upon governments, and peoples and
the most scrupulous attention to their manifold implications for
political relations among allies, with the non-aligned, and with
adversaries*, Indeed, given the present inhibitions against the
overt use of armed force, combined with the limitations of
diplomacy as an instrument for resolving profound conflicts of
national interest, the political and psychological consequences
of the nature and disposition of armed forces may be the primary
function, not just the by-product, of military strategy. Military
policies, like economic policies, have become a delicate and v










The military and non-military functions of an alliance are
related because allied military collaboration calls for consultation
and cooperation on the political purposes of the military effort,,
This compensates allies for the sacrifice of independent political
control that accompanies the subordination of national to collective
military requirements* More subtly, the two functions are related
because military strategy is a major medium through which allies
exert their political influence , not only with respect to the enemy
15
but also with respect to each other
The dual task of alliance military strategy is, therefore,
to support the security and diplomacy of the allies and to secure
the measure of strategic collaboration and political cooperation that
is essentialo Each member of the alliance must ultimately assess
the implications of military strategy for his national interests by
broader criteria than deterrence and defense
«
Since allied military power is equally a political weapon,
there must be means by which this power can be integrally related to
diplomacy,, These non-violent instruments of policy may take the form




The principles that the people of the United States believe





which is projected abroad by alliance military personnel can help
our foreign policy or it can destroy ranch of the good that has been
accompli shedo
When World War II was over, the United States devoted little
attention to the matter of political communication abroad until the
Cold War came alongo And presently, there seems no frank acknowledge-
ment that psychological strategy can act as a legitimate arm of power
along with military and diplomatic capabilities,. There is little doubt
that most American armed force commanders have not accepted coramun-
16
ication as part of their defense arsenal <>
Edward W„ Barrett sets down his formula for effective
international communication in
Effective international persuasion has two main components
$
(1) A continuing awareness of the likely reactions of others -
to be borne in mind when deciding an action , and (2) an organ-
ization and mechanism equipped to explain actions fairly, to
combat the lies and misunderstandings of others , and to persuade
foreign people that the United States deserves their cooperation*
In fostering international understanding among alliance groups 9
the organization and mechanism that Barrett mentions might well be
military personnel „ Realizing that it is of crucial importance to
maintain the military capability for a strong alliance , it is sometimes
overlooked that in this war of wills the material support given by
allies is not as important as their moral supports If allies become
16
John Boardman Whitton (ed ), Propaganda and the Gold War
(Washington? Public Affairs Press, 1963), p» 5»
17
Edward W Barrett, Truth is our Weapon (New York? Funk and
Wagnalls, 1953), p. 56„

18
doubtful , an aggressor finds opportunities for advancement that probably
18
cannot be countered with military strength*
By effective communication, the U.S. military personnel assigned
to alliance forces can play a central role in conveying the impression
of confident strength, sustaining the morale of threatened peoples,
and reinforcing bargaining positions in diplomatic exchanges.
Because of the overwhelming military strength of the United
States, it is not surprising that the governments of some of the
smaller countries are unwilling to defend or implement alliance policy,,
Many times the policy is only hazily understood by their officials and
is regarded by their national public opinion as having been dictated
by the United States.
"When, in November, 1960, General Norstad made public his
views on the desirability of stationing MRBM's in Europe, he was
widely thought, throughout Europe and the rest of the world, to be
voicing a new American policy, when in fact, he was attempting to speak
19
only in his international role," So it seems that many of America's
allies need a clearer insight than they now get into the considerations
that affect national and allied decisions.
Since one of the principal foreign policies of the United States
today is the decision to participate in and foster collective security
for the nations of the free world, the importance of improved liaison
18
Richard C. Bowman (LTOOL, USAF) , "National Policy in the War
of Wills" , U.S„ Naval Institute Proceedings. Volume 91 , N0o 4





between defense and political communication cannot be under emphasized.
The Sprague Report
,
prepared for President Eisenhower at the end of
his second term, makes this point clears
The American military establishment is a huge and powerful
system to protect the nation in the event of war In the
course of protracted conflict short of war - which is the
prospect - it will also exert enormous and continuing
influence in every part of the world in behalf of the
objectives of U S„ foreign policy<> Military personnel
at all levels will require greater understanding of the
role which the armed forces should play in this undertakingo
The Committee believes that additional measures should be
taken to create a greater awareness of the non-military
implications of military activities , a better understanding
of the importance of these implications and an increased
knowledge of what can be done by the armed forces to enhance
the positive and reduce the negative side-effects of their
essential activities.
This Sprague Report statement embraces what could be used






International or foreign relations are terms that can be used
synonymously and interchangeably with diplomacy*, In the broadest context^
foreign relations are the operations of diplomacy conducted by govern-
ments for the purpose of achieving their national interests*. One of
the principal- interests of the United States is the security of its
people » Shortly after World War II 9 the United States realized that
the size of the Soviet and Chinese war machines threatened the sec-
urity of numerous nations including the United State s<> This threat
i
has required a large and costly peacetime military establishment,,
Today v, American foreign policy rests basically on two major
assumptions., These assumptions are: (l) that a balance of power in
favor of the United States will deter any large-scale military action
of the Communist bloc threatening American security - a comparable
deterrent force is required; (2) that the United States cannot
maintain unilaterally a balance of power in its favor - a unity of
nations is required to assure a balance of power in its favor and to
deny additional gains to the Communist bloc As the most powerful and
influential member of these alliances $ the United States has become
2
the leader and s consequently, makes the largest military contributions.,
1
Ronald Jn Kurth (LCDR,USN) p "The Military and Power in the
United States" , U„S„ Naval Institute Proceedings Volume 91 P No« 5





In the conduct of foreign relations , close cooperation and
collaboration between the Department of State and the Department of
Defense is essentialo Prior to World War II, this collaboration was
largely off-the-cuff or an ad hoc matter,, Then in 1947, with the
formation of the National Security Council, interdepartmental
cooperation was permanently provided for There was the decision that
the planning of strategy and tactics should encompass all facBts of
the international effort - diplomatic, economic, political, and
military*
This decision to establish the National Security Council
came about because of the belated recognition of facts about the
Communist leaders; that these leaders recognized and respected power
in others and had only contempt for negotiations that stemmed from
weakness or fear» The United States had no choice but to continue
the military build-up and to press on with such alliance military
arrangements that were being made 8 It was the simple course of
3deterring war by making it dangerous for the CommunistSo
The search for an international doctrine capable of opposing
Marxist-Leninist theories was begun The pursuit of a system of
values strong enough to unite and stimulate national energies, hence-
forth, began to play a great part in military preoccupation* The
pursuit is still continuing today*
3
Edward W„ Barrett, Truth is our Weapon (New York; Funk and
Wagnalls, 1953), p» 230.
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This concept which now viewed the military as an integral
arm of diplomacy called for some sweeping changes in traditional
military thinkingo Military leaders had traditionally considered
their position "above politics" After World War II 9 they learned
rather rapidly that they could not operate alone from the complex-
ities of foreign aid s defense planning 9 and mutual security,. In his
memorandum to the 1961 Stennis Subcommittee hearings (Muzzling the
Military) p President Eisenhower wrote
8
I need not remind your committee 9 especially p that in these times
military considerations and economic^ political 9 and ideological
considerations are interrelated to such a degree as to make an
arbitrary dividing line between the military and the non-military
increasingly unrealistic a „ o
Later In 1961 9 President John FQ Kennedy emphasized the broad role
that military leaders must play when he addressed the midshipmen
at the Naval Academy s
„ o Fifty years ago the graduates of the Naval Academy were
expected to be seamen and leaders of men „ „ o Today 5 we expect
all of you - in factp you must p of necessity - be prepared not
only to handle a ship in a storm or a landing party on a beachj,
but to make great determinations which affect the survival of
this country,,
a e o You must understand not only this country but other
countries,, lou must know something about strategy and tactics
and logisticsp but also economics and politics and diplomacy and
history* You must know everything you can know about military
power p and you must also understand the limits of military power
You must understand that few of the important problems of our
time have^ in the final analysis 9 been finally solved by
military power alone When I say that officers today must
go far beyond the official curriculum^ I say it not because
1 do not believe In the traditional relationship

23
between the civilian and militaryp but you must be more than the
servants of national policy You must be prepared to play a
constructive role in the development of national policyp a policy
which protects our interest and our security and the peace of
the worldo
These statements by two former Presidents significantly
emphasized that the military had to give up their long isolation from
the dynamics of politics and diplomacy» The more or less permanent
threat of war had broadened the tasks which military leaders perform,,
"Their technological knowledge p their direct and indirect power p and
their heightened prestige result in their entrance
s
of necessity,
into arenas that in the recent past have been reserved for civilian
and professional politicians,,"*
Social Aspects of Military Diplomacy
The increasing role of the military in implementing foreign
policy has resulted in a growth in power of the military professions
This power growth has called for discarding the traditional isolation
of the military from the social scene Military force in international
relations has come to require political and sociological assumptions
at each step of planning and implementation*,
Morris Janowitz p in his study of Sociolofy and the Military
Ej&lhilflfrMflflH states that force in international relations involves




Morris Janowitz p Sociology and the Military Establishment
(New Torks Russell Sage Foundation^ 1959) p Po 17«
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of military operations, the consolidation of military outcome , and
the assessment of military effects And at each point in this cycle,
a sociological perspective is relevant,. He explains further that
military policy is so complex that important social tasks adhere
to the military also in peacetime strategy,, "The conduct of troops
stationed abroad, the management of foreign assistance programs, and
the implementation of military alliances are as much political and
6
social arrangements as they are military operations,,"
Therefore, force cannot be applied effectively merely in
terms of military considerations.. An understanding of human attitudes,
opinions, and behavior is equally as important
This thinking is not exactly new but in the past, sociological
assumptions of military leaders remained under cover or were limited
to stereotypes of how people of other nations behaved; particularly,
as to how soldiers of specific nationalities behaved in battle,. These
stereotypes usually were developed in the course of professional
careers as military observers, military attaches, or as participants
7
in allied military operations.,
As the military emerged as an Important segment of American
foreign policy and as the destructive prospects of atomic warfare
evolved, the professional military man found himself turning more
than often to the social sciences for basic understanding of other
nations,, Certain stereotypes had to be dlscardedo Samuel P„ Huntington
6





observed that like the lawyer and the physician, the professional
soldier was continuously dealing with human beings which required him




While professional soldiers, sailors, and airmen have begun
to broaden their intellectual background, major United States military
decisions have begun to reflect modifications to conform to the sooial
and political requirements of allied nations These actions, taken
together, form the basis for "political warfare", the British term
which conceptualizes the use of persuasion techniques in a military
and political context.
The concept of political warfare embraces the theory that
the conduct of military staffs in international alliances speeds up
or retards the development of regional political, economic and
diplomatic arrangements The actual deployment of United States
military forces and the threats or reassurances that military leaders
are daily forced to make, have been found to be the most potent
9
political warfare.
The targets of political warfare or persuasion are not merely
the leaders of opposing nations but they also encompass total
3
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populations, not only of unfriendly states p but of allies, neutrals,
and one's own nation as wello These vast targets necessitate that
strategy and tactics of military operations be managed so as to
maximize political impact and that these operations of the military
establishment be effectively coordinated with the techniques of
10
diplomacy and mass persuasion.
Morris Janowitz stresses the two-fold role that the military
plays in political warfares
Since political warfare involves balancing force and persuasion,
the military has a two-fold roles First, its behavior and pro-
nouncements must maintain the credibility of United States military
intentionso Second, the military must operate to assist in
strengthening alliance systems and in consolidating political
assets among neutrals. As absolutist doctrine increases and
wanes in importance, the emphasis on threats over persuasion
grows and declines, and the world image of the United States
is influenced accordingly., '
'
The image of the United States abroad is, at best, not exactly
what the nation desireso In Asia, many of the informed people do not
completely trust Americans because they still associate the United
States with the old colonial powers . American troops have, on occasion,
seemed to be an undue irritant, especially when their commanders were
oblivious to local sensibilities., "Editorial comments and the attitudes
of opinion leaders in the area reveal widespread belief that the Soviet
Union is as much interested in avoiding World War III as is the United
10
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States," Public opinion surveys in Western Europe indicate that if
there was to be a third world war, the United States might start it.
If this image of the United States is to be changed, the
military politics of strengthening alliances must incorporate the
principles of political warfare. Every type of military operation
in this "neither war nor peace" era must be judged on the basis of
its sensitiveness to political consequences,, An effective public
relations program could and should be the basic groundwork for
waging effective political warfare*,
Military Public Relations
Public relations is good administrations If public relations
is to be the basis for political warfare in the military, then an
adequate definition must be established if good administration is to
follow or vice versa. This definition, based on the one formulated
by Public Relations Navs
r is suggested*
Public relations is the military management function which
evaluates public attitudes (national and international),
identifies the policies and procedures of the nation and individual
command organization with the public interest, and executes a
program to earn public understanding and acceptance.
Traditionally, military public relations has been thought of
as merely public information. But, recently, concepts similar to the
above definition have emerged. With the military's new role as a major





to troop indoctrinations cross-cultural contacts and public opinion
surveys.
Today's top military men are beginning to assume their role
as diplomats by providing leadership that is responsive to public
opinion,. This trend is indicative of a break from the isolation which
prevailed until World War II. Not only has the professional commander
become aware of the internals interpersonal techniques of organization,
maintenance of morale 9 and negotiation but he now seems to be inter-
ested in developing a public relations aptitude,. This aptitude
enables him to relate and explain his position in terms of broader
political^ psychological s and sociological terms* These skills are
not found among all professional commanders, but there has been a
growth in the number of such military leaders,, "Between the top
leadership and younger officers there remains some suspicion and
apathy But this encrustation is gradually crumbling under the impact
1
3
of public opinion and emphasis from the top."
Some critics of military public relations say that the practice
is just part of the struggle of inter-service rivalries and budget
justifications and p indirectly t a contribution to the international
image of the United States, Other criticisms of military public
relations are that the services seek to exploit military demonstrations
or that PR activities of the defense establishment are the result of
13
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newspaper pressure to produce news a The latter portion of this study
will discuss these criticisms and demonstrate that they are sometimes
unfounded
o
To specifically illustrate how one service operates as an
arm of diplomacy or agent of international relations , it is helpful to
analyze the United States Navy and its political implications.
Navv Political Warfare
The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense collaborate
on foreign relations involving military considerations,, In turn, the
Secretary of Defense calls upon his military leaders for advice and
interpretation of foreign events in terms of their military significance*
The Chief of Naval Operations is the principal Naval adviser to the
Secretary of Defense*
The Chief of Naval Operations' immediate staff is comprised
of experienced officers who have extensive foreign experience as
attaches, advisers to foreign governments, or as experts at inter-
national conference s«
Navy collaboration with the Department of State is especially
necessary in the event of an international crisis or the outbreak
of war or revolution in foreign countries,. The Navy's job in these
events usually is to provide protection to American nationals under
the Department of State and Presidential direction. Just as the Navy
evacuated Americans from China during the Nationalist Revolution in 1927,
U
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so have thete been numerous times when Americans were protected in
Central America and the Caribbean republics,, The evacuation of
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in 1962 and the protection of Americans in
the Dominican Republic in 1965 serve as more recent examples,,
At times, naval officers are called upon to serve in a strict
diplomatic capacity* The visits of Commodore Perry to Japan in
1853 and 1854. resulted in the treaty of friendship and opened the
islands to commerce When Turkey was defeated in World War I, Rear
Admiral Mark H„ Bristol conducted American diplomatic relations in
Constantinople o During the second World War, Admiral Harold R„ Stark,
in London, was the diplomatic channel of communications with Free
French leaders which brought about the African landings, and
Commander Harold E„ Stassen was recalled from the Pacific by
President Roosevelt to serve on the American delegation at the United
1
5
Nations San Francisco Conference
American ships have been used by the President in a number
of ways to carry out American foreign policy,, Had President McKinley
not sent the battleship Maine into Havana harbor in 1898, the war
with Spain might never havtf happened,. President Theodore Roosevelt
ordered the American cruiser, U S So Nashville, into Colombian waters
in order to assist the Panamanian Revolution in 1903» In 1908, he
called on the Navy to implement his policy by sending the "Great White
15
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Fleet" on a globe-girdling cruise. Spectacular Pacifio demonstrations
and Japanese port visits properly impressed Japan with American naval
strength during negotiations regarding the Open Door policy in the
Far East. Before Pearl Harbor , President Franklin D. Roosevelt
used American ships for convoy purposes in the North Atlantic. If the
President had not provided naval vessels for the convoying of Lend-
Lease supplies as far as Iceland in 194-1 p perhaps the American destroyer,
U.S.S. Reuben James, would not have been sunk by German submarines.
After World War II, President Truman used the battleship Missouri
and several other ships in the Mediterranean in 194-6 to supposedly
carry the body of the Turkish Ambassador, Ertegun, to Istanbul. But,
the actual mission of these ships was to put into Turkish, Greek, and
Italian ports to emphasize American policy in countering Soviet
pressure in those countries. In all of these cases, the executive
use of naval strength was relied upon to carry out current foreign
16
policy.
The American Navy is many times concerned with international
conferences and machinery designed for arms limitation and atomic
energy control. The Washington Conferences of 1921 were held to
establish international naval control but political and territorial
issues as well as disarmament were at stake. Subsequent assemblages
convened at Geneva in 1927 and at London in 1930 and 1935 were entirely





the control of atomic energy in the NATO alliance centered about
the Navjo The multilateral manned , nuclear fleet dispute is yet to
be solved
glial Baggim
Of more recent origin in American foreign policy,, is the
use of allied naval erercises to demonstrate United States military
intentions or to strengthen ties with various nations
In February of 1965? before the United States began massive
air retaliation against the Viet Cong in North Viet-Nam, a large
scale naval exercise was staged in Southeast Asia,, The Philadelphia
Inquirer reported the exercise and drew cogent conclusions
s
XDKUSUKA, Japano Febo 27 (UPl)o - The U„S„ 7th Fleet now patrolling
the waters off Vietnam, will conduct a large-scale war exercise
in the troubled Southeast Asia area starting March 12$, it was
announced here Sundayo The code name is "Jungle Drum Three"
The sea-land exercise , to be conducted jointly with Thailand
bears a striking resemblance to actual conditions U S„ armed
forces would encounter in Vietnam should the war there escalate
to a point where massive U S armed intervention was neededo
The war exercise was announced by outgoing commander of the
7th Fleet, Rear Adnu Roy L Johnson*, Johnson said the exercise
envisions a situation where an insurgent force, supported by a
hypothetical "aggressor" nation must be dislodged and destroyed
as quickly as possible,.
The significance of such an exercise, just 500 miles from
South Vietnam, where U S„ charges that North Vietnam is supply-
ing and directing the Communist guerrilla warfare, was clear
*
It was believed both Communist North Vietnam and Communist
China would protest the operation just as they denounced a
similar U S amphibious assault exercise currently being
conducted off the coast of Californiao
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That exercise is dubbed operation "Silver Lance" and also bears
a striking resemblance to the current situation in South
Vietnam » „ „ ^
In contrasts, many allied naval exercises are timed and staged
when the United States feels that international ties need to be
strengthened,. On October 28, 1964, the Chicago Tribune reported the
joint Spanish-United States naval exercise , STEEL PIKE Is
ALMERIA, Spain, Oct. 27 (Reuters) - The United States marine
air corps gave a public show of its striking power here today
in the second day of the big Steel Pike I war games
Military observers and newsmen watched as jet fighters roared
off from a temporary air field on dusty flatlands and returned
to demonstrate an experimental arresting brake that yanks
them to a quick stop«^°
On the same day in 1964, The New York Times printed an article which
stressed warm Spanish ties to the United States
s
MADRID, Oct. 26 - The state-guided Spanish press and radio
stressed friendship and cooperation with the United States
Monday against a background of strained relations with Britain,,
The large-scale joint amphibious maneuvers on the coast of south-
west Spain, which began at dawn, provided the occasion for the
professions of amity toward the United Stateso These contrasted
with a recent up-surge of anti-American feeling in information
media here»
The press compared what it described as close United States-
Spanish collaboration with an increasing chill in relations
between Madrid and Londona The recent debate on Gibraltar
in the United Nations and last week's decision by the new
Labor Government to cancel British participation in proposed
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These allied exercises would serve no purpose of promoting
American foreign policy or political warfare if they were conducted
in secrecy without the participation of the press and official
observerso Therefore, it is mandatory that the United States Navy
maintains some organization to make these war games known to the
publico The remainder of this study is concerned with the political
warfare machinery that the Navy uses to achieve the public relations
impact so vital to American foreign policy*.

CHAPTER III
COMMAND INFORMATION BUREAU AND ALLIED IMPLICATIONS
It is the stated policy of the Department of the Navy to provide
the public maximum information concerning naval exercises and operations
consistent with security regulations,, In joint exercises, the exercise
commander is instructed to establish a public information group repre-
sentative of participating services to function under his direction.
This group is designated the Command Information Bureau<>
The Command Information Bureau encompasses more than just
public information, however,, A more realistic definition for the
bureau would be an organization established during a major exercise or
operation to conduct and coordinate public relations . The Navy^s
reluctance to use the term public relations, out of necessity, limits
the official definition.
Although the exercise commander is responsible for the direction
of public relations, it is impossible for him to personally supervise
the Command Information Bureau. He, therefore, appoints a subordinate
officer to direct public relations. This officer assumes the title
of "Information Control Officer", "Information Director", or "Deputy
of Information".
1
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The establishment of a Command Information Bureau becomes
necessary in allied exercises when the exercise will come to the
public's attention and draw media interest*. Of prime importance,
as will be discussed later , is to establish an agreement between all
participating nations, that publicity is desiredo
The general mission of a Command Information Bureau is to
promote the idea of combined action in a common defense against
aggression} "to promote the atmosphere of friendship, mutual respect
and understanding between the United States and her allies and to




When issuing orders for the establishment of a Command
Information Bureau in 1961 (Operation PONY EXPRESS), the Commander-
Seventh Fleet stated
s
In general, the CIB objectives are the same as those for the
exercises To bring the SEATO partners into closer, more efficient
working relationships for mutual defense; to create confidence
and understanding among all participants! and to increase the
prestige and understanding of SEATO SEATO sponsorship of PONY
EXPRESS should be stressed in all publicity » « <?
2
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An important adjunct to the mission of combined action is
realistic training in information procedures* The communication
techniques that would be required if actual hostilities developed
are brought into play. The Pacific Fleet Commander states in his
operation order that "CIB personnel derive the same benefit from a
training exercise as do other personnel involved; therefore , the
GIB
s
during an exercise, shall be organized to function in the same
manner as it would during an emergency. N However , in actual con-
tingency plans - not exercise plans - it is not always possible to
forecast public information policy. The only beneficial step is to
plan a personnel input so that there will be people available to
do the work if the contingency organization is formed. Thus, in
most fleet contingency plans, there is some provision for the
assignment of personnel to a public information section if the plan
envisions operations of any magnitude.
The over-all mission of the Command Information Bureau is
to supervise all public relations aspects of an exercise or operation
in a realistic atmosphere. This includes the coordination of the
exercise objectives with CIB operation orders, publicity, press
briefings, photographic coverage, communication facilities, trans-
portation, funds, and the arrangements for official observers.
A national exercise involving only the U.S. Navy is more or
less routine in nature. The public relations aspects of the exercise




function in a routine manner,. But the participation of foreign nations
in naval exercises creates certain complications that must be considered
if effective public relations is to evolve,,
Cross-Cultural Complications
Within the Command Information Bureau (GIB) as in other allied
endeavors, it is possible to observe a familiar human problem* Par-
ticipants are caught between a desire to subordinate their personal
ways and an inability to break away from their separate identities and
long-standing stereotypes of other nations,.
The successful director of a CIB will recognize that a central
question in the matter of national attitude and belief is the way
that members of any given nation perceive the members of another,,
And that the nature of the various types of images, their comparison




let, to attack the problem of stereotypes is no simple man-
euver. In the early 1950*8, a UNESCO survey of eight different
countries helped to lay the ground work for bringing out into the
open the various images that people harbor in their mindso The results
of the survey founds (1) that there exists in all countries surveyed
,
a tendency to ascribe certain characteristics to certain people \
(2) that there is a uniform tendency of all countries to describe
the Russians in the same terms, and somewhat less agreement in
5
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describing the Americans? (3) that stereotypes of one's own country-
men are invariably in flattering terms j and (4) that the prevalence
of complimentary over derogatory terms in a national stereotype is a
good index of friendliness between nations,,
Intercultural sensitivityn—In the Command Information Bureau,
particular attention must be paid to the importance of understanding
one's natural behavior or the non-verbal aspect of culture contacto
Formal training in the language , history
,
government, and customs
of another nation is only the first step in a comprehensive
program of understanding foreign cultureso Of equal importance
is an awareness of the non-verbal language which exists in every
country of the world. Most Americans are only dimly aware of this
silent language even though they use it every day. They are
conscious of the elaborate patterning of behavior which pre-
scribes our attitudes toward work, play and learning., In addition
to what we say with our verbal language , we are constantly
communicating our real feelings in our silent language - the
language of behavior,,'''
This quote from Edward T„ Hall's The Silent Language emphasizes the
difficulties of intercultural communication,, GIB personnel must
realize these difficulties,, While Americans pride themselves on
being outspoken, other people , such as the Greeks, deplore this
behavior,, Americans try to limit the length of meetings while others
(Greeks, Spaniards) like to work things out in detailo In the Middle
East, Arabs become angry when anyone tries to look into the future,
while in Japan, a majority of the people are insulted if an inter-
preter is requested. The Japanese regard an educated man as one who
6
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can speak and understand English fluently,.
When first coming into contact with foreign cultures
g the now
popular concept of "culture shock" may be encounteredo Culture shock
is caused by the distressing feelings of uncertainty and anxiety that
result from not finding all the familiar symbols, signs, and cues
that guide a person through his own culture He does not know what
people expect of him and what he should expect of them* In the con-
duct of allied public relations, nothing could be more dangerous than
lack of intercultural sensitivity,, Since sensitivity is basically
identification, the successful Information Officer in a CIB should
strive to gain objectivity and widen his perspectives by freeing
8
himself from the limitations imposed by national cultural inhibitions,,
Culture shock is usually accompanied by a linguistic shock
that makes even more difficult the crossing of cultural sensitivity.
The allied Information Officer should realize that he will never
be able to completely conquer cultural barriers until he knows the
language of his allies because language is the principal symbol of
eommunication,. And it is generally recognized that interpersonal
communication is far more effective than the mass communication
methods
e
Language «—There is a widespread belief among international
relationists that study of a language, even if mastery is not
achieved, attributes to liberation from provincial!sm„ It is argued
8
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that language is more than a skill - it is a means of understanding
the total culture of a people because it is the system through which
almost all behavior and beliefs of a society are reflected and trans-
mittedo In other words , some knowledge of language provides certain
understanding of other people which can be obtained in no other way„
In the field of professional diplomacy, personnel with language skill
have shown the greatest accomplishmento They are able to gain the
confidence of people abroad and arrive at a more profound understand-
9
ing of the local situation,,
Even though English is the official language of most United
States alliances, the allied information officer should be cognizant
of the advantages afforded by knowing other language s« For full
cooperation with a foreign country and its people , at least a small
knowledge of the country' s language is a requirement,,
The United States enjoys an envious position in respect to
the English language The predominance of French as the official
language of diplomacy was diminished at the Paris Peace Conference
following World War I. Two of the Big Four, Wilson and Lloyd George,
could not speak Frenchp and Clemenceau could speak English as well as
Freneho So, much of the discussion took place in English,, At the
San Francisco Conference, convened to draft the United Nations Charter
during World War II, English and French were designated the working
languages of the conference. Consequently, English rose to the level
9
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of French as an official language of diplomacy.
The elevation of English to an official diplomatic language
has not solved the problem of alliance communication. It was not
until World War II that there was a general awakening in the military
to the grave shortcomings in language capability,. In the complex
tongue of the Japanese, the Navy was virtually helpless. Additionally,
serious handicaps were encountered in communicating with some of the
new allieso Now, twenty years later, no great strides have been
taken to rectify the situation.,
The U.S. Army is now the executive agency for Armed Forces
language instruction. The language skills available under the
Army program are wide enough to embrace any possible world contin-
gency. But the effective use of the courses is up to the various
personnel bureaus in their selection of students. Perhaps, in the
long range, it is more important to build up in the services a feeling
that language ability is an important asset and that the time spent
11in acquiring this ability is well worth it particularly so in the case
of Public Information Specialists, " Communication of ideas in a common
..
12
language may be the passkey to survival".
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A contributing factor to the language problem in the Navy
is the specialization of its personnel The policy of rotating younger
officers in operational assignments and the program of frequent re-
assignment p prevent officers from acquiring geographic specialization*
It is true that upper-level assignments to certain areas, such as the
Far East or Europe, frequently are filled by officers who have had
previous experience in the area. But this cannot be said to be a
general practice throughout the Service. An officer may start out
in France, then be sent to Puerto Rico, and next to Japan,, To a
certain extent this is desirable. Certainly it would be unwise to
permit a select few to ensconce themselves in the most desirable
billets and expect others to remain content in the less desirable
areas. Nevertheless, non-geographic specialization contributes to
the problem of officers being unable to speak the language of the
country to which they are sent. This may prove somewhat disconcerting
not only to themselves but also to the people with whom they are
expected to do business.
In the Command Information Bureau, language problems arise
in furnishing an adequate number of interpreters. Each group of
newsmen and observers usually requires the services of an inter-
preter. In June of 1957 y the International Naval Review involved
17 different countries which furnished 33 ships plus 82 ships supplied
by the United States, The size of this operation is clearly not




The translation of news releases, publicity, and exercise
brochures may be a problem area. One significant difficulty is that
there are so many interpretations of certain words that translations
frequently are faulty and misleading. Vhen the Information Officer
of the Taiwan Defense Command uses the word "democracy", the Chinese
Republic Officer will readily agree with him in principle, but his
interpretation of the word may be entirely different.
The problem of working with nations that do not use the
Roman alphabet may lead to complications in communication transmission.
Allies such as Greece, Turkey, or the Chinese Republic may run into
difficulty by trying to use American communication facilities and
vice versa. This problem does not occur frequently. However, when
it does, two solutions are feasible. "One is to air-lift the public
information material, in the native language, directly to the country
concerned, if time and space factors permit. The second is to have a
qualified officer assigned in the country' s naval headquarters to
receive the release in English and then translate it."^
These language problems are certainly not insurmountable or
unsolvable. Yet, in the Navy, there is too much dependence on the
ability of foreign nationals to speak English. For allied public
relations personnel, some knowledge of the language of the countries






Relations among officers and enlisted men assigned to an
allied Command Information Bureau can be strained by political dis-
agreements, national pride, and different economic, social, and
cultural traditions. These divisive influences are not countered by
developing doctrine « But they can be lessened by an understanding
of the causes and probable effects
National pri,d
,
e «—Some of the United States" alliances have been
a successful military concept for some years c In the political and
economic fields, however, the alliances have a less successful record.
There is an indication that it is easier for armed forces to learn
to operate together in an exercise situation when major national
interests need not be sacrificed, than for nations to integrate
politically and economically; the latter calling for larger
sacrifices of national interest and a greater secession of sovereign-
ty This means that the United States and her allies have a fairly
effective military organization - one that runs large and small
exercises each year - but one which is directed by a government
whose cohesive effectiveness becomes less and less, each echelon up
the ladder. At the top of the ladder there may be a chief of state
who publicly degrades the alliance, one who refuses to discuss
controversial matters, or in a few cases, one who publicly upholds
the alliance
o
These overtones of national differences will, of course, be
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brought into the Command Information Bureau* Although the Bureau
personnel may not be familiar with political negotiations in detail,
each will be sensitive to continuing disputes between his nation and
other countries represented in the CIB* This awareness, coupled
with strong national pride, may become evident in competition for
positions within the Bureau.
When plans are drawn up for a Command Information Bureau,
not only rank but also title must be considered,, The United States'
Chief of Information is a Rear Admiral who does not actively partici-
pate in exerciseSo The Philippines" Chief of Information is a
Lieutenant who does take an active part in allied exercises. Special
considerations should be given to the titles of these information
officers and assignment in the Bureau should be made with title
in mindo
Other points along this same line are outlined in Changing
Patterns of Military Politics . A study of the NATO Defense College
revealed certain differences among officers that could very well
apply to a Command Information Bureau*
The difficulty was that some American officers were perceived
to be lacking in the personal stature appropriate to their easy
assumption of leadership* American officers held high rank * * *
but they were considerably younger than most allied officers*
They appeared less versatile , more narrowly specialized, and
more likely to remain lowly 'Indians' within their huge military
establishment* Although they lived in better hotels and enter-
tained more splendidly, there were perceived to be less well
born, less well educated, deficient in essential historical
knowledge, and deplorably weak in languages . * *"14
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These perceptions could easily generate an undercurrent of anti-
American feeling among CIB personnel if they coincide with a sense
of American national power
Relative military strengtfru—The United States possesses
world-wide interests and a military capacity to pursue them by in-
dependent action. This capacity is unmatched by any other alliance
country. In allied exercises, the unequal contribution of forces
can hinder the public relations impact if not carefully handled.
During Operation STEEL PIKE I in 1964, the United States
and Spain staged the largest peacetime amphibious exercise in
history. Although the personnel participating ratio between the
United States and Spain was 40 to 1, one of the foremost public
relations considerations was to treat the Spanish forces as co-
equals at all times. In most allied exercises, the United States will
furnish the majority of ships, personnel and logistic support, Yet,
on a percentage basis of forces available, the smaller nations may
supply more. Command Information Bureau personnel should take care
when preparing publicity to clearly emphasize that all nations
(not just the United States) participate and contribute to the success
of the exercise.
Supplying the majority of forces to naval exercises will
usually lead to the selection of a U S Naval officer as exercise
commander. Here again, press releases and other information




trabive style *—Differences in national administrative
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style can create a problem for the Command Information Bureau,,
Americans in particular have a distinctive style derived from the
conditions under which they work at home G Bureaucratic relations
have been known to replace intuitive personal understanding in
organizations where members cannot deal on completely familiar
terms,, Especially in foreign situations^, Americans tend to follow
the system to which they are accustomedo Spit and polish^, dead-
lines p organisation charts 9 and tempo of work have a tendency to
15
become more important than achieving the exercise objectives,.
In a study of the NATO Defense College s mentioned before
,
European officers frequently feel that personal creativity and
personal recognition are impossible in the system that Americans
take for grantedo Functions are too highly specialized^ vertical
and horizontal clearances too numerous 9 editing of reports too
ruthless p and subordination to prescribed formats and cliches too
16
obligatory ~ argue these officer
s
GIB personnel should keep these criticisms in mind when
working with allied personnel,. At the same time 9 it should be
kept in mind that the administrative style being followed does not
necessarily have to be wrong,. Striving to sustain a public infor-
mation program which best serves the interests of the United States
government P while coinciding with the information objectives of an








Nations have different policies concerning the level of public
relations to be conducted during joint exercises The planning and
execution of public relations mustp therefore 9 take into consideration
the policies of all participants,.
Even in respect to the United States,, there is no set rule
for the level of public relations to be conducted,, Each exercise
must be evaluated in relationship to the current political climate
„
The following excerpt from a summary of Operation STEEL PIKE I
illustrates this points
Political considerations precluded specific public relations
planning for STEEL PIKE until less than three months before
the scheduled jumplng-off date for the operation,, On July 31 9
Commander in Chief Atlantic Command ( GINCLANT) proposed to
the Joint Chiefs of Staff that an energetic and all-out effort
be expended to encourage and accomodate Spanish media repre-
sentatives,, This recommendation was subsequently forwarded
to the Department of Defense (D0D) o The GINCLANT Public
Affairs Officer (PAO) also arranged to present his position
before a joint conference of officials from the Department of
State p Defense and the Navy Department „ Sensitive political
aspects required further study before a decision could be made ° '
After the national level of public relations has been decided , then
these objectives must be tailored to coincide with other nations,,
The Navy is in a unique and enviable position in regard to
announcing exercises and arranging civilian coverage „ A fleet
17
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exercise is often so scattered that it can hardly be observed,. The
Navy can conduct a much larger exercise at sea unobserved than the
other services^ ashore or even in the air The exception is an
exercise of an amphibious nature,, So, public relations planning must
be conducted simultaneously with operational planning,,
Questions such as these must be answered? Is this exercise
large enough so that it will be noticed? If not, is it advisable
to call it to the public's attention? What will be gained by so
doing? Will the long range objectives be served best by issuing a
short 9 factual announcement a day or so in advance and then sitting
back passively to answer questions s if any? Will a full-scale public
relations effort prostitute the exercise into a demonstration for the
sake of VIP observers or newsmen? Does the Task Fleet Commander
want a maximump so-so 9 limited^ or minimum public relations effort?
Is the Admiral wrong in downgrading an exercise which is worthy of
more recognition? If so, how should the persuasive opinions and
recommendations be documented and presented for the "ultimate"
Public Information Officer s consideration?
Once these questions have been answered from the national
point of viewp they must then be reviewed in relation to the points
of view of the other nations involved in the exercise „ After some
agreement is reached as to how the other nations will react p they
can then be approached with some kind of proposal,, In any event,
it is mandatory that all concerned forces agree on public affairs
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policy , the wording of the initial release , delegation of releasing
authority, number of observers to be invited , and so fortho If the
time is taken to explain why the United States desires to do some-
thing in attaining some end, it is usually found that foreign
counterparts will be more than willing to help<J°
If it is agreed by all participating forces that the
exercise is of such a nature to draw public attention and warrant
a full-scale public relations effort, the Command Information
Bureau comes into beingo
13
Letter from Public Information Officer, United States
Taiwan Defense Command, June 10, 1965©

CHAPTER IV
ANATOMY OF AN ALLIED BUREAU
Because any fleet exercise is extremely complex in nature
s
relatively short in duration and involves large numbers of people
and equipment p the organization of a Command Information Bureau
is essential to the over-all success of the exercise
»
The Command Information Bureau comes into being when the
operational commander conducting the exercise issues a letter of
instruction,. This letter designates the director of the Bureau
(or Officer in Charge 9 or Public Affairs Officer , or Deputy) and
outlines general policy for public relationso When the exercise
commander issues the final operation order , it Includes an annex
solely concerned with public relations This annex contains
specific details as to the Director s responsibility^, location of the
CIB 9 organization p activation date p and planning procedure,,
In allied exercise a 9 there are no set requirements for
the Command Information Bureau director,, The selection of the
director is usually based upon considerations such as the size of
the operation,, anticipated news interest^ number of official
observers*, and the necessity of having a director who is familiar
with the type of operation being conducted,.
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The following examples will illustrate how these factors
apply s
NATO's GRAND SLAM had forces from the UoS, Sixth Fleet and units
of the Italian, French, and British Fleets. All forces operated
continuously at sea and no newsmen were embarkecL The exercise
was scheduled by the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern
Europe, in Naples, Rome newsmen commuted to Naples to cover it.
No flagship was required nor was it necessary that the director
come from the participating forces* The director was the public
information officer of the NATO command in Naples, who was
acquainted with the Rome press corps.
In the bi-lateral, U,So -Korea amphibious operation BLACK OX,
the CIB director came from the Seventh Fleet's amphibious
force. No flagship was required because the CIB was ashore.
The prime requirement was to have a director who was thoroughly
familiar with amphibious operations.
Exercise TULUNGAN, held in the Philippines, had a flag officer,
with a flagship, head the CIB, The admiral was not participating
in the exercise, thus, his assignment did not impair any oper-
ational aspects of the exercise. His flagship was required to
embark newsmen. Additionally, his staff was required to augment
the CIB representatives from participating commands. The
magnitude of the exercise dictated the desirability of having
a flag officer appointed,
^
At other times, familiarity with the working press becomes
the prime consideration in director selection. In the NATO exercise
TEAM WORK, a U S Navy captain was chosen for the top bureau job
because nhe is quite well known to all and would stand a better
chance of influencing the press than someone unfamiliar to London,"
1
Robert S, Jones (CDR,USN), "Command Information Bureau in
Allied Operations" (unpublished paper in the files of the Office of
Information, Navy Department, Washington, D C - undated and
mimeographed), p, 13,
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After the director is designated , the next step in building
the Command Information Bureau is to decide on the location, Logic-
ally, the GIB will be in a ship or ashore - or botho
Normally", the shipboard CIB is an organization embarked in
the flagship of the exercise task force commander. The main re-
sponsibilities of the organization are the coordination and dis-
semination of information through official news releases , active use
of the Fleet Home Town News Program, and coordination of visits by
news media representatives and official observers to the flagship
and task force units The flagship must be adequately equipped for
accomodations
,
press briefings, news conferences and facilities for
filing press traffic while newsmen are embarked « Subordinate infor-
mation bureaus ( Sub-CIB 's) are established in other ships as re-
quired under the direction of the Command Information Bureau director,,
The land-based Command Information Bureau is, of necessity,
located within the public domain, either in the continental United
States or overseas. Its responsibilities encompass all those listed
for a shipboard bureau plus details which are brought about by the
CIB fl s physical dislocation from the flagship and the operational
elements
o
The Command Information Bureau must be as near as possible
to the scene of action, without being so close that operating pro-
cedures are restricted by the exercise,. Any number of sub-CIB's
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can be established in ships during an operation p but the main GIB
should be established at a position where an over-all view of the
exercise progress can be gained.
For the SEATQ exercise TULUNGAN (amphibious assault) , the
Bureau was located in a ship Media representatives and observers
were taken aboard in Manila and taken to the Mindoro exercise area
where the landing took place However P for the Spanish-American
exercise STEEL PIKE I (amphibious assault) „ it was decided early
in the planning stages to locate the major GIB in Madrid for two
reasons,, First 9 it would be located in the city where the Spanish
seat of government was located for more effective liaison Secondlys
Madrid was the city in Spain where most American and European news
media were located,. Of course p the nature of the exercise called for
additional sub-GIB °s at Seville <> the closest city of appreciable
size to the objective area with airport facilities p and Almerla 9
site of the Marine Corps SATS (Short Airfield for Tactical Support)
which would be used during the exercise Additionally;, sub-CIB 8 s
were located at the ports of embarkation for the exercise 9 at
Morehead City and Sunny Pointy North Carolina and Charleston,, South
Carolina,, These sub-CIB s were activated at the beginning of the
embarkation phase of the exercise and disestablished when embark-
ation was completed,.
Early in the planning stages the physical facilities of the
CTB must be considered,, Often times it is necessary to install tele-
phones 9 procure desks and typewriters ^ arrange for photo developing
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equipment p and rapid means of communication,, For the NATO exercise
TEAM WORK
s the major GIB was located at the Main Building of the UK
Ministry of Defense in London where the facilities were not entirely
adequate During the SEATO SEAHORSE exercise^ the Manila sub-CIB
was in a section of the U S Embassy where it was necessary to install
phones 9 typewriters^ and other equipment,, Two SEATO exercises p BLUE
STAR and PONY EXPRESS^ confirmed that a Navy AD (Destroyer Tender) is
far from ideal as a GIB location,. Necessary communication equipment
was found to be lacking which hindered rapid transmission of the
operation s progress
When the location of the GIB is establishedp it is most
important to let the press s observersp and participating commands
know where the operation is taking place to insure a smooth and
orderly flow of information into and out of the GIB or sub- GIB*
In forming a separate public relations group to handle a
particular event 9 one of the foremost considerations must be given
to formulating strict delineations of authority and an exact assign-
ment of taskSo There should be no confusion or misunderstanding as
to who does what This particularly applies to handling public
relations because almost any undertaking involving contact with
non-naval personnel can rightfully be termed "public relations" 9
whether it be handling crowds p conducting tours p answering letters
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or phone calls , or distributing literature. However , any tendency to
assign various odd jobs to the public information group, merely because
"public relations" seems to be involved, may result in a dilution of
the main effort of disseminating information,, This is true when the
meeting, transporting, billeting, and entertaining of VTPs and dis-
tinguished guests are concerned, since such a task obviously requires
a special all-out effort and can well turn a public relations agency
3into a strictly host organization,.
There seems to be a consensus among Navy Public Information
Officers that separating protocol functions from news media functions
is a major organizational pointo One experienced Information Officer
states the problem in these terms s
One major piece of advices if at all possible, stay out of the
protocol business,. There are many who believe that PIO's should
also take on the chore of caring for VIPso This is a fallacy*
Any intelligent officer or man who knows how to get around a
particular area and is courteous, smart in appearance, and
alert can do a good job of taking care of VIPs, including
arranging for hotel rooms, meals, and other necessities of life.
But these same general qualities don't qualify personnel as
PIO»s, And if the public-information effort is diluted in
order to respond to protocol requirements, the GIB is not doing
its jobo Doing a good job of taking care of media represent-
atives and keeping information flowing is quite enough of a
task in itself. If a protocol section is incorporated into a
GIB simply for practicality, one should insure that the per- .
sonnel therein come from other than the public-affairs office.4
Official observers are representatives that are nominated
by participating nations, and other member countries of the alliance,
3
Naval Review (June 12, 1957), p, 37-33,
U
Letter from Public Information Officer, United States
European Command, July 2, 1965a
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to witness the operation or exercise being conducted,. These observers
who are usually high-ranking government personnel are more of a
"guest" than the newsman,, and additional courtesies must be accorded
them *'
Because of this organizational problem, the typical Command
Information Bureau consists of two major sections s public infor-
mation and protocol. Aside from these two main divisions there
may be adjuncts such as a photo section or briefing team.
Public information and protocol for allied exercises are
controlled by the officer in charge of the CIB who is directly
responsible to the exercise commander« The two sections are usually
instructed to work in close coordination with each other The
responsibilities of the public information division consists of
promulgating public information policy for the operation as deter-
mined by the exercise commander, issuing special instructions to
public information officers of units participating in the operation,
coordinating photographic coverage for publicity purposes, coordinat-
ing matters of mutual interest with the local USIS, arranging for
special publicity features, arranging for transmission of press copy,
coordinating the transportation of news representatives and official
observers with the protocol division, and arranging for press brief-
ings, conferences, and receptions,.
In turn, the protocol division is responsible for coordinat-





insuring that the ships arrange for billeting and messing in which
newsmen and official observers are embarked, providing escorts for
newsmen, official observers , and VTPs p and arranging for inter-
preters when appropriate
o
If a separate briefing team division is established., the
responsibilities include presentation, classified or unclassified
as appropriate, to newsmen and observers on the various exercise
phases,, A photography division is responsible for insuring that
photos are newsworthy, of a public information nature , and that
complete captions accompany all pictures,,
For Operation STEEL PIKE I, it was decided during the
initial round of talks that visits by news media representatives
and official military observers could be more effectively coordinated
by two separate organizations,. It became apparent that widely di-
vergent interests existed,, So in addition to a Command Information
Bureau, a Joint Visitors Bureau was created to coordinate visits by
official military observers to the exercise site and ships of the
amphibious task force at sea„ However, many of the activities
scheduled,, such as briefings and conferences, were for both groups,.
In the final exercise critique, it was emphasized that these joint
briefings hindered the independent operation of each bureau,.
Exercises such as STEEL PIKE are generally scheduled to test
contingency plans and general operating procedure s„ In the
case of an actual implementation of an operation plan there
would be no visitors and therefore, the GIB would have to
function independently,, Greater training value would have
been realized by independent operation,. In future exercises,
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the dB and JVB should be completely separated in all respects
and be co-equal in exercise status °
This critique could well begin a new trend in the public relations
organization of allied exercises,.
The SEATO exercise PONY EXPRESS had more of a typical Command
Information Bureau» The director was a U S Navy captain assisted
by three advisors representing SEATO , USIS 5 and Great Britain
Three major sections comprised the GIB - Public Information Protocol
,
and PhotOo The Public Information section was directed by a British
colonel who was assisted by seven American officers*, two British
officers^ and one Australian officer Protocol was headed by a
British colonel who was assisted by six American officers and one
Australian officer Q The Photo branch had one American lieutenant
7
and eight enlisted photographers
For PONY EXPRESS , separate briefings and conferences were
arranged for the media representatives and official observers©
Since all were aboard one ship to observe the exercise , the observers
were briefed while the press was eating dinner and vice versa
The degree of efficiency of a Command Information Bureau
will be directly proportional to the talent of the personnel,,
6
William R Dennison (J0C 9USN) p "Critique of Operation
STEEL PIKE I" (undated and mimeographed) 9 p<, 14*
7
Report of SEATO Exercise PONY EXPRESS Command Information
Bj^eja (May 9<> 1961 )„ p* D-1.
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Obtaining qualified and experienced , allied GIB personnel may often
be a major problem* Information officers are not plentiful in the
allied navies and experience in CIB operations is quite often lack-
ing,, Usually, it is a luxury to have someone to assist specifically
for radio and television, someone specifically for still pictures,
and still another specifically for press queries,, But if these
assistants do not know their job, they can be detrimental to the
efficiency of the GIB.
Early in the exercise planning stages, necessary groundwork
must be laid to insure that enough people are available to do the
job„ No matter how competent the personnel of a CIB may be, they
are human and can work twenty-four hours a day for only a brief time.
And if there are large numbers of media representatives in the area,
the CIB must be able to respond to their requests at any hour* The
CIB must also be able to respond to the inevitable queries, demands,
and orders from superiors, which in this day of rapid communications,
come at all times.
On the other hand, over-staffing can lead to over-organization
and subsequent accomplishment of very little good Some information
specialists think that a large CIB is not called for in anything less
than a "shooting" or "near shooting" situation. For instance, it has
been observed that some of the large exercises have had as high as
fifty people in the information bureau and then when the exercise
started had only seven newspaper men to cover the operation,, Whereas
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other operations, such as a Presidential visit involving up to 150 press
representatives, were handled by one or two trained information officers,,
Foresight and adequate planning seem to be the answer to the
number of personnel involved in the bureau operation,, If press cover-
age and number of observers cannot be properly estimated, then it
would probably be wise to over-staff at first and then release
personnel if they are not needed*
Of prime importance in the personnel area is the partici-
pation of all commands in the CIB„ The U QS Q Naval Public Information
Manual states s "The public information group (GIB) „ „ shall be
proportionally representative of all commands involved in the oper-
ation or training exercise tt° This is particularly good advice for
allied information bureaus from an operational standpoint » More
likely than not p media representatives and observers from all the
participating nations will be on hand* Information officers from
these countries will be more familiar with their own press require-
ments and protocol? aside from speaking the language,. As mentioned
in Chapter III, special considerations should be given to the titles
of these information officers when assignment is made Many times
rank must be overlooked,.
8
UoSo Superintendent of Documents, UaS, N&^
Information Manual NAVEXQS P-1(VK (Washington, D C„s U„S<








U So Navy Captain
Protocol
Philippine Army Lt„ Col,
7 UoSo Marine Corps Officers
1 Philippine Naval Officer
1 Philippine Air Force Officer
6 Philippine Defense Ministry
Representative s
8 U S Naval Officers
Information
UoSo Marine Corps Lt. Col.
7 UoS Naval Officers
1 U So Marine Officer
3 Philippine Army Officers
1 Australian Air Force Officer
During the recently held SEATO SEA HORSE exercise, a U.S.
Navy Lieutenant Commander was in charge of the Manila sub-CIB. His
staff consisted of officers of the Philippine Air Force, Philippine
Navy, British and Australian Navies, Australian Air F®rce, and a
Royal Thai officer.
After the International Naval Review of 1957, another strong
point was made concerning adherence to rank structure. During the
course of the operation, it was found that the organization of a
large public information group presented certain personnel problems
that were lacking in other military organizations.
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A strict chain of command according to rank structure is not
always feasible within the organization,, This problem becomes
especially delicate when personnel report for only a brief
temporary periodo The basic reason for this is the fact that
public information personnel are not all equally qualified..
For example p one officer may have specialized in newspaper
work 9 while another may be a TV specialist,, A strict ad-
herence to relative rank therefore may not always be the
best way to perform the task at hand,, No concrete recommend-
ation can be made as to how best to meet this problem^ except
to state that a continuous appraisal of the situation must be
made,, and personnel changes effected according to the needs of
that situation,. If all hands understand this policy and the
reasons for it 9 the problem of relative rank need not be an
insurmountable one„°
The experience level of allied bureau personnel cannot be
over emphasized,, There is no substitute for experience when dealing
directly with international media and observers „ The U S Navyp
usuallyp is cognizant of this facto
In the planning stages of Exercise STEEL PIKE I 9 it was
emphasized that because of the locations of the overseas sub-CIBs 9
information personnel would have to be kept at a bare minimum with
all personnel being capable of a large variety of assignments*,
Furthermore
s it was stressed that a portion of the public infor-
mation officers assigned should have a Spanish-speaking capability
and that enlisted information specialists be in the senior grades,,
In an analysis of the NATO exercise TEAM W0RK 9 it was
stressed that the GIB should be composed of knowledgeable information
personnel s preferably those who have had both civilian and military
9
Report of fornix nri Information Burea^ 21 n p„ 39«
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experience o A final recommendation stressed that in order to achieve
favorable impressions both from the exercise and the training of
wartime staffs <, it was necessary that experienced personnel be
obtained to conduct the information portion of any exercise » This
recommendation probably grew from the fact that certain commands
had assigned intelligence officers as public information officers
to the GIB in LondonQ Intelligence and public information activities
should always be kept separate with separate personnel to man each
activity., The two are counter-productive and contradictory
At times,, when a large information bureau is necessary and
personnel are not available to man it 9 Naval. Reserve information
specialists are called to active duty just for the exercise period,.
This was the case during Exercise TEAM W0RK o Ten U S Naval Reserve
officers and oim Royal . Reserve officer augmented the London GIB
staffo In this instance p it would have been impossible to operate
the information organisation without their assistance o The TEAM
WORK critique contained a recommendation that reads "Major commands
and MOD" s (Ministry of Defense) should identify Reserves who take part
in NATO exercises and insure that the press are at least made aware
of their contributions,,"''''"
Many of the housekeeping chores of a GIB are better handled
by personnel that are not information specialists,. This point was
10
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high-lighted by Exercise STEEL PIKE I Q Because of the nature of the
GIB organization for STEEL PIKE (six sub-CIB 8 s) s the public affairs
director and other public information officers assigned to the infor-
mation bureau spent much of their time negotiating contracts for
services,, distributing cash payments and making other related financial
arrangementSo Assignment of a Navy supply officer to the bureau would
have made these arrangements easier and would have freed the PIOs for
their primary responsibility in the exercise
One final point should be made concerning GIB personnel -
proper indoctrination^, This indoctrination is best disstonanated
by issuing a set of instructions These instructions should contain
the basic policy and mission of the GIB plus specific "nuts and
bolts" items As personnel report for dutyp they should be given
the instructions and personally reminded of the importance of their job c
For any public relations organization to perform its mission^
there must be full support from top management This is particularly
true concerning an allied information bureau<> Therefore 9 a major
requirement in advance planning is to insure that the exercise
commander recognizes the vital importance of the public relations
mission? that PR is not something to be shoved into the backgroundo
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There is probably no other problem in the Navy public relations field
that has been more difficult to solve than this one p and without its
solution the finest plans in the world for a GIB may turn out to be
next to useless o The man in charge of fighting a war or being pre-
pared to fight a war sometimes cannot see the necessity for public
relations - and convincing him is not an easy tasko Subsequently 9
Naval information officers must conduct a 365 day-a-year campaign
to impress upon their superiors the importance of the work they do„
Planning for the public relations aspects of an allied
exercise should commence with the advance operational planningo This
coincidental planning is significant because information personnel
can advise on policy which may determine or alter operational phases
of an exercise o A case in point was Operation STRIKE BAGK 9 an attack
carrier striking force exercise 9 which was held off Norway in 1957»
The original operation plan called for the carriers to be
operating far at sea Q By cutting the CIB into the planning
stage earlyp it was determined that it would be more advantag-
eous 9 from an operational stand point 9 to move the carrier
task forces into an area closer to Norway„ This permitted
observers and correspondent
s
9 and PIO material 9 to be flown
between the force and Norway»
Aside from location of the exercise 9 planners should also give a
priority consideration to the public relations viewpoint when





The date and time of the event has a vital bearing on possible
radio, TV, and newsreel coverage. From the standpoint of TV
coverage , a week-end date is preferable , with Sunday afternoon
being the optimum. This observation also applies to newsreel
coverage <, since all newsreel services make up their reels on
Mondays and Thursdays and need at least one day's lead-time
when shooting film. From the spectator standpoint , a Saturday
or Sunday afternoon is also a preferable time, for obvious
reasons o In the case of newspaper and magazine coverage
,
the main consideration should be to choose a date which would
not generally coincide with a known newsworthy event which ._
might be a 'bigger story' in the eyes of the press and public.
Conversely, there is some danger that information personnel
may become so engrossed with the major aspects of what they are
doing that they miss the minute links which make the big picture
come into focus. Public relations plans must constantly be compared
with operational plans to insure that they are practicable. An
exercise should not be prostituted into a demonstration for the
sake of observers or newsmen. Surprisingly, some exercise commanders
are more guilty of this pitfall than information personnel.
The GIB should be permitted to function with authority as
soon as it is practicable and feasible to do so. Normally, the CIB
wiH be activated for planning purposes when the letter of instruct-
ion is received from the exercise commander Full activation of the
bureau usually takes place three weeks to one month prior to the
exercise commencement. When the date is known, the CIB director
informs concerned commands when their representatives should report.
All representatives should report in time to participate in
advance planning.
13
KflBQrt of gofflnffnti XnfQraaUon Bureau ZL$ p° 37
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To plan most efficiently, a list of public relations objectives
and the action necessary to carry out such objectives should be drawn
up as early as possible Each participating nation must agree on
these objective So
In the planning stages of the NATO exercise TEAM WORK, the
major objective of the information group was to obtain publicity on
the value of NATO to Western defense,, "Opportunities such as this
did not arise often and as a result the 8 man-in-the-street 1 was largely
unaware of the importance of NATO« For this reason it had already
been agreed that TEAM WORK should be given maximum press treatment? ^
In exercise PONY EXPRESS, one of the information objectives
was to increase the prestige and understanding of SEATO by the use of
publicity. But certain limitations were later introduced by Great
Britain because of political implications,, "The UK desires as
little mention of Singapore as possible in connection with the exer-
cise - for political reasons. This includes mention of Singapore
as a loading out port for the UK ships and troops«, M *
Exercise TEAM WORK also had a political objective concerning
the appearance of Soviet units in the exercise area© This statement
is recorded in the final exercise reports
Conclusion .. Determination in advance at a political level ex-
actly what should be said when Soviet units appeared in the
exercise area was vital to the success of the dB
U
Notes of a meeting held at the Ministry of Defence,
Whitehall Building, London (May 21, 1964)0
15
Report of SEATO Exercise PONY EXPRESS GIB. p B-3„
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Recommendation,. That future GIB organizations have it clearly
understood by all companders what statements will be released to
the press should Soviet ships and aircraft appear in the
exercise area,, 16
Occasionally, widely differing public relations objectives
may be encountered in the planning stages of an exercise „ Some of
the United States 1 allies may wish to emphasize the offensive nature
of the exercise, while the U S„ Navy may prefer to stress the de-
fense against further aggression,. These objectives must be changed
or compromised during the initial planning,.
After the over-all objectives and information policies are
formulated, then plans must be made for the date of CIB activation,
location of GIB, locations of sub- CIB e s if required, further plan-
ning conferences, operation orders, USIS assistance, publicity,
briefings 9 photography, invitations to the press and observers,
transportation, communication facilities, funds, advance trips,
and miscellaneous details,,
"Vision" is the key word for the guidance of a public relat-
ions group p1an Vision is not only the most important element in
the planning process, but is also represented in the end objective;
i e , to see the operation as it unfolds This implies the need for
careful consideration and planning of the visual representation
desired, whether by photography, by television, or for official
observers* An early formulation of plans for these types of coverage
is a most essential part of a successful public relations operation*
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Flexibility in advance planning is vitally important during
the early stages of organization*, The ability to reshuffle the
organization to meet the changing pressures of events must be anti-
cipated to the fullest extent. This can only be accomplished by
contingent nlanning. However, the foundation of the public relations
group must firmly rest upon sound premises and basic fundamentals.




Planning Conference .—The director of the information bureau
begins the "nuts and bolts" planning phase of the exercise by calling
for a planning conference. Attendees should represent all partici-
pating nations and should be the same officers who will serve in the
CIB„ It is desirable that the planning conference be held at least
60 days before the exercise commencement to provide ample time for
ironing out minute details.
The information officer on the staff of Commander - U.S.
Naval Forces 9 Philippines, recommends that the planning conference
consider the following matters:
1. Agreement on what is releaseable and non-releaseable
Information and the scope of authority to be given
to member nations to make their own releases.
2. Preparation of a brochure if desirable.
3. Agreement on activation date of the CIB and sub-CIBs in
selected areas.
17




4-o Estimation of the number of military observers, civilian
observers, and media representatives who will cover the
exercise
o
5. Provide for escorts, transportation, and billeting of
observers and press a
6. Organization of briefing teams
7. Scheduling of events, press conferences, briefings, and
social functions including the issuance of invitations.
8 Provide for communication and logistic requirements




Disaster plans for unforseen contingencies should be added to this
list. Most Naval and Marine Corps exercises involve extremely
dangerous phases. Exercise STEEL PIKE I made this point quite clear.
With the exception of the tragic loss of nine Marines in a two-
helicopter crash early on D-Day, the landing was an outstanding success*
Operation order ,,—The basic operation order for the CUB is
written at the planning conference or shortly thereafter. The format
of the operation order follows standard guidelines set down in the
U„S Naw Public Information Manual. Of course, deviations and
changes are made to the format as the specific exercise dictates. A
typical operation order annex is included as an APPENDIX.
USIS participation*—The United States Information Service
maintains career officers in most allied nations. These are Public
18
Letter from Public Information Officer, Commander - U.S,
Naval Forces, Philippines, June 29 9 1965.
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Affairs Officers attached to the U.S, Embassies or Consulates. More
than likely, these USIS personnel speak the local language , know the
local social customs, are aware of the local political and military
atmosphere , and are familiar with the communication media of the
area.
Many times the Navy information officer is hampered by the
fact that he is stationed on a ship. Being afloat most of the time,
he has a very limited opportunity to form working relationships with
the foreign press. The Sixth Fleet information officer in the
Mediterranean (an afloat command) prefers to have USIS personnel
escort newsmen and observers when they come from Rome or Madrid.
"You always are better off with someone who speaks their language
fluently, knows their press mores P which often are different from
19
ours, and possibly knows the individuals well, personally. n
Even if the information officer is stationed ashore, he
finds that USIS offers valuable assistance. This statement by a
shore based officer attests to this point:
The United States Information Service (USIS) provides valuable
assistance to U.S. Military overseas and should be included in
all phases of your planning. Normally, overseas, USIS provides
the means for releasing information to the foreign press. They
also assist in accrediting correspondents. They will translate
releases, make the actual distribution to the press and provide
media contacts for you. 20
19
Letter from Public Information Officer, Commander - United
States Sixth Fleet, June 7, 1965.
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Although a CIB was not established for Exercise UNITAS IV, a
novel use of USIS personnel was made when Director Edward R. Murrow
loaned the Navy a Public Relations Advisor for the Operation (August 17-
December 1, 1963) The UNITAS operation was a joint anti-submarine
warfare training exercise. The U.S. Navy Task Force, numbering from
two to five ships, with an air detachment, joined with naval elements
of South American countries in planning and implementing the operation.
The size and nature of the UNITAS visit automatically made
it a matter of interest for USIS. Over a thousand men and officers
in port for several days constitutes a large potential for a good or
bad impact. The joint exercises, of a technical nature, between
the navies of at least two and at times several countries, were
designed to build not only professional excellence but also respect
and understanding.
This was readily recognized by the USIA and Director Murrow
assigned a senior advisor for the duration of the operation. A
circular instruction was sent to the posts to be visited, advising
them of the impending visit, USIA action taken, and urging full
cooperation.
The response by USIS was generally fine. Working in cooperation
with the Naval Attache or Chief of Naval Mission, excellent results
were achieved. Coverage in every medium was extensive in all but a
few cases.




The presence of a senior USIA officer with the fleet gives an
early liaison with the USIS staff in each country. It is recommend-
ed that he be provided when requested by the Navy, He can be
useful in several ways* His presence indicates the interest of
the Director in the operation to local USIS staffs. He can supply
the Admiral with pertinent information from Embassy sources where
it is indicated or needed. He can precede the fleet arrival by
several days and check various arrangements; sometimes programs
are arranged which exceed the capabilities of the crews, or
which do not take full advantage of the potential available.
He can assist in- the public relations aspects of all the activities
which have been outlined. And, finally, he can keep his own
Agency informed as to the operation and its impact, *1
Perhaps Mr, McDermott's cruise has helped to establish a precedent
in increased Navy and USIA/USIS liaison.
Invitations .—Media representatives and official observers
will normally be invited to survey allied exercises by the CIB director
in the name of the exercise commander. There are certain exceptions,
such as amphibious landings, when the host nation invites official
observers.
The number of invitations issued is determined by billeting
arrangements available in the CIB flagship or ashore. Chapter V
discusses invitation priorities and associated considerations.
To provide for coordinated representation, member nations
usually forward a list of media representatives to be invited to the
CIB director for comments and suggestions. In some cases, the CIB may
be authorized by the various nations to issue invitations on their behalf.
21
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Invitations should be issued sufficiently in advance to enable
news agencies to plan their coverage. Advance notice, however, is some-
times curtailed by security requirements. For Exercise TEAM WORK, an
effort was made to invite the press and still maintain the required
security of the exercise. It was determined that the best approach
would be to request the defense establishments of each participating
nation to issue invitations to selected editors and publishers in
confidence by telling them in general terms of the exercise and the
time frame. This proved very helpful for the European press and
resulted in approximately thirty-eight media representatives accept-
ing invitations to go aboard the fleet ships. It proved very unsat-
isfactory with the U.S. Secretary of Defense because the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs did not receive the instruct-
ions as planned. Only six U.S. press representatives were invited to
22
cover the exercise. Fifteen could have been accommodated.
More typically, the announcement press release usually has a
note to the editors stating what press coverage is contemplated. This
release is then followed by a formal invitation from the GEB director.
Invitations to media representatives should avoid "over
selling" the exercise. No indication should be made that would cause
a correspondent to expect preferential treatment. Invitations to
newsmen should also state that "male only" are authorized to be embarked
in ships and "should include such details as where and when to report
22
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to the CIB, clothing to bring, costs, media communication arrangements,
photography, and any security restrictions," 2^
Information
Information is the most important function of the Command
Information Bureau, The objective of all information issued by the
CIB should be to promote, as a diplomatic force, an atmosphere of
friendship, mutual respect and understanding between the United
States and her allies. Therefore, political connotations and con-
jectures associated with this information must constantly be borne
to mind.
Press releases .—There are two major types of press releases
Issued by the CIB. One is the official communique which strives to
give all participants appropriate publicity. The other is a release
prepared by individual participants who wish to write additional
releases slanted for national consumption.
This latter type of release usually contains national slang
and emphasizes national objectives. These releases are forwarded to
the nation concerned for transmission over national circuits. For
example, U.S. Navy personnel prepare releases for the Fleet Hometown
News Center, covering various personalities and participating units.






The official news release policy is established by the exercise
commander or the headquarters of the defense alliance This policy
is contained in the GIB operation order.
The initial press release is the most important from the
standpoint of generating media interest,. Two of the United States'
alliances, NATO and SEATO, differ in their initial release policies.
"In NATO, the command conducting the exercise submits the release
to all NATO ministries of defense and to the NATO council for approval
and releasee In SEATO, the alliance's headquarters issues the
initial release."^ Subsequent releases, in both alliances, are made
by the GIB.
The date of the initial release must always be taken into
consideration. For Exercise STEEL PIKE I, the initial news release
was to be released simultaneously in Washington, Norfolk and Madrid
approximately one month prior to D-Day (October 26, 1964.). Because
the initial news story, being of national interest and involving
another nation's armed forces, required the approval of both the
governments of Spain and the United States, it was necessary to have
the release ready for approval by mid-August<?5
It was decided in the spring of 1964 that if press interest
in Exercise TEAM WORK was to be aroused, that as much advance notice
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(UoS Captain) pointed out that the well-informed members of the
United States press corps were already aware that a major NATO exercise
was in the offingo These exercises had been held at about the same
time every four years and little deduction was necessary to realize
that 1964. was the year scheduled for the next exercise » In view of
thir»j, he could see little merit in procrastinating over the issue date
of a pre-exercise press release,. The director proposed that a press
release be issued early in August for Exercise TEAM WORK which commenced
September 21 •
After the initial release is authorized;, subsequent official
releases are authorized by the CIB director,. These releases are
made up of newsworthy items submitted by participating commands,, They
contain background information concerning the various units and all
major events of the exercise, Additionally, some operation orders
stress that the CIB be notified immediately of any accident, actual
injury to personnel or significant material damage «,
If the exercise is well-planned, a definite release schedule
of static events can be prepared in advance with a minimum of personnel
before the CIB is activated,. To keep interest alive in the exercise,
it is not advisable to include all releasable information in the
first few releases,, Details and pertinent facts should be carefully
spaced,, But care should be taken not to prepare too many releases
which are too long and say too little „ One experienced information
26
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officer offers this advice on press releases
s
Decide on the key phases of your exercise and cover these by
releaseSo For example, in an amphibious landing exercise, you
have an initial release telling the who, what, where, etc., then
you peg one of the ships 8 departures from homeports, next the
embarkation of troops, then the rendezvous with the striking
and covering forces, followed by an anti-submarine warfare and
anti-air warfare report, and then by a release on the advance
forces operations, culminated with the Marines hittin' the
beach. One or more releases on what the landing force has
done ashore nicely ties the package. Believe it or not, I've
seen amphibious exercise CIBs generate as many as 30 releases,
when seven or eight would have been more effective from a
news standpoint,^
Other experienced information officers feel that perhaps
the information bureau should not concern itself at all with official
releases. Some exercises have indicated that news media "live cov-
erage" of an operation is much more valuable than attempting to cover
the operation by official releases. In Exercise PONY EXPRESS, the
initial press release was promulgated by SEATO headquarters on
April 5j> 1961, and included, as a note to editors, an invitation for
news media representatives to cover the exercise. Subsequently, the
GIB issued ten official releases to U S and U K, Navy authorities,
USIS, and SEATO headquarters for dissemination to member nations.
Material for these releases was derived from reports or releases
submitted to the CTB by various components of the Amphibious Task
Force and the Marine Landing Force, The final report of the exercise
contained this recommendation:
The function of the CIB to issue official releases is quite distinct
27
Letter from Public Information Officer - U,S. Taiwan Defense
Command, June 10, 1965,

81
from the other functions concerned with accomodating observers
and pressmen, and it appears that the Officer in Charge of the
CUB is not in the best position to make such releases,. It is
recommended that the Officer in Charge of the exercise have this
responsibility in future exercises inasmuch as he is far more
knowledgeable of t\ details of the exercise and the up-to-the-
minute happening-' as they occur, and as a result is in a better
position to judge the newsworthiness of information. In either
case $ official releases prepared after invited pressmen are 'on
j& scene 1 must not be issued until after these pressmen have
ad an adequate opportunity to file their own copy. 28
i?rom this recommendation, there appears to be a possibility that the
CIB's official releases might come into competition with the working
press. Yet, it seems that the GIB is the logical organization for
C'- 1 "oiling or coordinating all releases. The exercise commander,
even though "more knowledgeable of the details" and "up-to-the-
minute happenings", will probably have little idea of what traffic
the press is filing.
Briefings ,—Because of the importance of face-to-face
communication, briefings should reach the maximum press audience.
Past experience has indicated that briefings by responsible commanders
on special phases of allied exercises are sources of continuing news
and usually receive international coverage. Consequently, allied
information bureaus most always make arrangements to tell the public
the importance of all aspects of the exercise through special brief-
ings on appropriate phases of the exercise. This discussion centers
on press briefings since the official observer/media representative
relationship was covered in the organization section.
28
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A GIB briefing team is usually composed of senior operational
officers representing the participating units in the exercise,, The
team gives presentations, classified or unclassified, as appropriate,
to newsmen and observers,, In general, these briefings present the
purpose, scope, composition or forces, scheme of maneuvers, tactical
situation, and the arrangements which have been made for the press
and observers to see the various phases of the exercise.
The press briefing conducted in Manila for Exercise PONY
EXPRESS is a typical example,, A U S Navy rear admiral opened the
briefing with a short statement concerning the purpose of the exer-
cise,, He then introduced the SEATO public information officer, a
Wing Commander in the Pakistan Air Force, The Commander spoke briefly
on the importance of SEATO and then turned the floor over to a colonel
in the U S, Marine Corps who spoke on the special situation of PONY
EXPRESS and the amphibious task force. Next on the program was a
U So Marine major whose purpose was to familiarize the press with the
operations on D-Day as it pertained to the Landing Force, Then a
British Marine captain explained the organization and character-
istics of the major land force units which would be deployed in the
exercise. Finally, a British commander explained, in detail, the
29
various press arrangements.
The locations of briefings vary as the exercise dictates.
If possible, they are held in the operational area's major media
29
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centers prior to the exercise commencement • Later briefings are held
for those correspondents assigned to cover the exercise, either at
shipboard or land based CXBs and sub-CIBs,, Aside from planned brief-
ings, it is advisable to arrange for the escorted press and observers
to receive on-the-spot briefings at selected observation and command
posts o A summary briefing should be held at the conclusion of the
exercise These summary or "hot wash-up" critiques normally draw
extensive media interest, especially if something out of the ordinary
happens during the exercise,. Exercise TEAM WORK proved this pointo
At the end of TEAM WORK, the British and American exercise
commanders held a post-exercise press conference aboard the U SoS
Newport News at Portsmouth, England,, Press interest had reached a
high peak during the exercise because of excessive Soviet air and
sea surveillance o The briefing afforded the two commanders an
excellent opportunity to stress the importance of NATO in countering
the Soviet threat. The Times of London reported?
Concerned at Russia's constantly growing naval and merchant
fleet, Admiral H. P c Smith, Nato Supreme Allied Commander,
Atlantic, believes Russia intends to 'challenge our supremacy
at sea, and this is a challenge we should not ignore '„
Admiral Smith said this yesterday on board the United States
Navy flagship, Newport News, which is visiting Portsmouth. He
felt that the forces he had were enough to maintain supremacy
in the North Atlantic, but he also felt that the losses incurred
in meeting a submarine threat would be greater than he would
like to contemplate, 'With more forces we could do a better job
and greatly reduce the losses we expect,' he said,™
30
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A headline in The Daily Express read "That NATO exercise was 'very
successful'" above the following copys
The recent seven-nation Nato exercise 'Team-work' involving HO
ships, 178 aircraft and 30,000 men, attracted the attention of
ships from Russia.
But they caused no embarrassment and learned nothing new, the
Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, Admiral H c P<> Smith, U.S.
Navy, said last night. But, he told a conference in Portsmouth,
there was a greater concentration of Soviet ships at this
exercise than any before ... Verdict on the Nato exercise?
Very successful. 3'
One final type of briefing is directed neither toward the
press (although it may be covered by the press) nor observers,, This
briefing may be given to civic groups or other interested organ-
izations. This was the case with Exercise STEEL PIKE I. On October U,
1964., at the invitation of the Chief, Joint U.S. Military Group,
Spain, the CIB director gave a brief STEEL PIKE presentation to some
600 members of the American Club of Madrid. The briefing was well
received and covered extensively by the local media. *
Press kits ,.—Normally, the CIB press kits are prepared well in
advance of the exercise. Typical items in the kit ares
1. Biographies of the major commanders
2. Photographs of the major commanders
3o Histories of participating ships accompanied by "at sea"
photographs
4o Map of the exercise area
5» Official releases that were made prior to the date of
issuing the press kit
31
The Daily Express (London), October 3, 1964«
32
William R. Dennison, p. 11.

85
6. Welcome aboard message
7<> List of key GIB members and phone numbers
8. Schedule of the exercise events
9. Support arrangements such as local transportation,
accomodations, meals, costs, and security restrictions
A brochure is sometimes included in the press kit. It contains a
history of the defense alliance and some of the items listed above.
These brochures should be printed in the language of each partici-
pating nation.
The main factor in preparing these materials for the press
and observers is to determine as early as possible what information
will be needed. Often, this information must come from faraway
sources and will have to be condensed.
Photography.—Photography which strongly emphasizes the
multi-nation flavor of an exercise is extremely valuable in helping
to achieve the public relations mission. As in other functions of the
information bureau, careful planning is the keynote.
U.S. Navy photo teams are available within the various fleets
and can be requested from the fleet commanders for exercise coverage.
Other allied nations have similar teams which are detailed by the
participating foreign forces. These photo teams usually report to the
GIB photographic officer who coordinates all official photography.
Media representatives, on occasion, will be accompanied by




Proper indoctrination of photographers 9 adequate equipment 9
and rapid means of dispatching film are the major concerns of the
information bureau,.
From past experience s it has been realized that Navy photo-
graphers need detailed instructions as to what they are to photograph,.
It is not sufficient to tell them to "cover the story" as civilian
photographers are told The exercise schedule of events must be
balanced against the available photographic resources with photo-
graphers stationed accordingly Then the photographers must be told
what is going to happen and exactly what he is to shoot» But 9 after
instructions he should not be deterred or distracted from his
assignment,.
After indoctrination^, processing facilities must be made
available both for the official photographers and media represent-
ative Sp bearing in mind that there are different requirements for
still and motion picture photography,. During Exercise STEEL PIKE<,
the importance of this requirement was emphasized,. Although many
civilian news photographers were on the scene on D-Day and Navy and
Marine Corps still and motion picture cameramen were present <> no
physical facilities were available on the beach at Huelva p Spain,
for the immediate processing and releasing of still photographs,,
The courier system used was efficient to a degree , but a prepositioned
33photo processing van in the assault area would have been much better,,^
33
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The Exercise PONY EXPRESS critique pointed out that a more complete
photo-processing laboratory than is available in a destroyer tender
is desirable i o e p a fully equipped photo lab should be available for
processing and printing still photographs aboard ship.
Just as for the written word p rapid means of dispatching film
and photographs must be provided for If the exercise is held at sea 9
ship to ship transfers and carrier flights must be arrangedo If
ashore 9 air and land transportation must be scheduled to the media
centerso Some ships are equipped with facsmilie gear which elec-
tronically transmits still photographs For Exercise TEAM WORK s
media representatives were allowed to use the facsimile gear News-
men who used the service made prior arrangements with the na^y of
their country to present charges to the wire service or newspaper after
the exercise was completed
»
As a summary of the items that must be considered in planning
photographic coverage of an allied exercise 9 this excerpt from the
TEAM WORK operation order outlines the major requirements §
1o It is expected that widespread photographic coverage will be
made of the exercise p both by civilian photographers embarked
as media representative s 9 and by official military photographers
a« The exercise presents an outstanding opportunity to acquire
pictorial material concerning combined operations of the
personnel^, navies and air forces of seven nations*,
2 Exercise commanders will supervise the taking of still and
motion pictures for official release through CIBs s both
afloat and ashore »
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Photographic annexes should stress coverage of the combined
operations, concentrating efforts on getting as many still
photographs and as much motion picture footage as possible
of personnel and units from all of the participating
countries, particularly when personnel and units of two or
more countries can be shown operating together,,
Inasmuch as military photographic personnel will be from
several countries, commanders should outline specific
responsibilities for coverage in the various task groups,.
Commanders will insure that all fleet units and head-
quarters participating in the exercise render the utmost
cooperation to still and motion picture teams, so as to
derive the greatest public relations value from this
medium.
Commanders will direct that still and motion pictures
taken by military photographers are transferred daily to
CIBLANT in London by the scheduled carrier flights, in
order that they may be used to the maximum for news
purposes,,
Film taken by civilian photographers will also be sent
ashore to CIBLANT, or other designated agencies, as
expeditiously as possible during the exercises by carrier
flight*
Commanders will request afloat commanders to make the
facilities of shipboard photographic laboratories available
for processing still pictures by civilian photographers,
as may be required 34.
Media representatives assigned to cover an allied exercise are
on the scene to report on a continuing basis,, Therefore, the information
bureau personnel must be well-acquainted with all available means of
34
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communications such as military electronic communications, commercial
facilities, military airlifts for film and tapes, and commercial
airlift capabilities
,
Needless to say, newsmen must be able to transmit their copy
regularly and rapidly or the whole exercise will be to no avail insofar
as public information is concerned,. Official news releases filed from
the operation area to an official release point must receive equally
efficient treatment or they become useless. If the CIB is a day late
on a story, or on furnishing information for the basis of a story,
then it may be discovered that a newsman has written an article without
clarifying information because he could not wait any longer.
Newsmen should be advised of communication arrangements before
they report to the CIB, Navy transmitted copy is either delivered to
a media outlet, or turned over to a commercial organization for further
transmission. Advance instructions to media representatives should
specify costs (U,S, Navy ships charge five cents a word and five
dollars a facsimile photo) 35 and require that newsmen have author-
ization for their press copy to be transmitted on a charge basis for
Navy costs, and on a collect basis for commercial transmission after
receipt ashore, 3"
Before the ships departed Manila for the SEATO Exercise SEA
HORSE, arrangements were made to send photographs, some copy and
motion picture footage to Sangley Point by carrier flight each day.
35






Distribution to the media in Manila was then made* Regular and flash
press releases were sent by message to the naval communications center
at Sangley and delivered to the CIB at Sangley. The CIB, in turn, made
delivery of the messages to the sub- GIB in Manila.
Early on the morning of STEEL PIKE's D-Day, newsmen were taken
to the amphibious objective area near Huelva, Spain, to cover the
details of the assault and beach build-up phases. At 2s 00 p.m. that
afternoon, a military courier was scheduled to transport press mat-
erials to Madrid for those newsmen who desired the service. TELEX and
telephone facilities were made available at Seville so that newsmen
could file copy upon their return from the beach in the late afternoon.
When the military courier reached Madrid, the press materials were
taken to the International Press Club where information bureau per-
sonnel coordinated pickup by media representatives.
Any sizeable exercise requires that early contact be made with
communication personnel to determine the optimum amount of equip-
ment available and of more importance, to insure that these personnel
understand the requirements of transmitting press traffic. Aboard
ship, it is usually sufficient for the CIB director to confer with
the communications officer to insure that he understands press trans-
missions. But if there is any doubt, it is advisable to contact
higher authority to establish special circuits to be used only for
press traffic.
Where the physical communication facilities are limited, some





the problem was handled in this manners
Press traffic filed by media representatives should be transmitted
by separate circuits as expeditiously as practicable
Media representatives, authorized to file pret ? copy, may file up
to 800 words per day, as communications conditions permit. Copy
must be filed in takes of approximately 160 wo:is, and should be
submitted in duplicate, double-spaced sheets, ?he number of
words that may be filed may have to be reduced in the event of
communications difficulties.





This means that if material is ready for filing s i tultaneously,
take one of wire services will be filed first, followed by the
first take of syndicated copy, of dailies, and of veklies.
Then the second takes would be filed, in the same itiority, etc.
This priority system will, where necessary, take cc:dzance of
the international time zones. Afloat commanders ma., modify this
system to meet the demands of an unusual situation.- 7
In past exercises, one serious communication shoi \ oming, as
far as the press is concerned, is the unavailability of wo. \\ news.
During Exercise PONT EXPRESS, the GIB flagship did not have \ iff-
icient equipment to guard her fleet broadcasts, maintain the \ ip to
shore radio teletype circuit, and copy incoming press. In 19' during
the Laotian crisis, the CIB flagship had all circuits employed fa press
copy transmission and guarding required operational circuits. " t a
result, embarked newsmen, who were responsible for coverage of So t .-
38
east Asia, were unable to keep abreast of the news."
37





The STEEL PIKE critique suggested that the best way to handle
communication problems in the GIB is to assign a technical commun-
ications officer whose primary job would be to trouble shoot and correct
communication deficiencies*.
Transportation
In many allied operations 9 the information bureau must provide
transportation to the exercise area for media representatives and
observerso In all exercises p transportation must be provided within
the exercise area.
In the Atlantic and Mediterranean^, commercial transportation
is usually available to most exercise areas unless p of course p the
entire operation takes place at sea<> In the Pacifie p commercial trans-
portation is usually not available to most operational areas and must
be provided by the CIB„ Exercise PONY EXPRESS offers an excellent
example of what may be encountered in an amphibious exercise
„
Press and observer's transportation in the objective area
was by LCVP (small landing craft used for landing the Marines) The
GIB flagship p U S S Prairie 9 obtained two of these boats from boat
pools in Yokosuka and Subic Bay and two were made available by the
UoSoSo Vernon County (a LST) Ashore transportation was by heli-
copter and jeep. Four helicopters and several jeeps were made avail-
able to the CIB„ Almost all movement of press and observers was by
helicopter with the jeeps used for short runs and administrative duties Q
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An RAF aircraft was used to fly sixteen observers and press
representatives from Singapore to Jesselton and retum The unavail-
ability of an RAF or other UK aircraft to fly press material, tapes
and exposed film from Jesselton to Singapore on D and D plus 1 days
was a major shortcoming in the CIB operation,, This service had been
requested but other commitments precluded its provision,, An alternate
plan for use of the commercial Jesselton-Singapore flight for this
purpose on D-Day was not feasible due to the late arrival of the
connecting helo flight to Jesselton,,
A U„S„ Marine aircraft was used to fly the remainder of the
press and observers from Bangkok and Singapore to Jesselton and return,,
A UoSo Navy aircraft was used to fly press and observers from Manila
to Jesselton and return and also to make press runs to Manila on D and
D plus 1 days,. On D-Day, the helicopter which was to fly press mat-
erial, film and tapes to Jesselton did not make its scheduled stop at
CIB headquarters ashore and the material had to be sent on a later
flight in the afternoon arriving too late for the commercial flight
to Singapore,™
For exercises not conducted entirely at sea, it is advisable
for some member of the CIB staff to make an advance trip to the
various exercise areas to determine the best observation points and
what transportation will be required,, Following this trip, requests
must be submitted to the operational commanders so that adequate
39
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transportation is reserved when the time arrive s» This trip should be
made as early as possible in the planning stages to insure that all
transportation is not spoken for by someone else
It was decided in the planning stages of Exercise STEEL PIKE
I that following D-Day the newsmen and observers would be flown in
shuttles via C-130 aircraft from Seville to Almeria where they would
observe the Marine's land-locked carrier deck in action - landing and
taking off both propeller and jet aircrafto It was further planned
to return the Madrid-based correspondents directly to that city from
the airfield site rather than back to Seville and thence to Madrido
The remaining media representatives would return to Seville and then
disperse in their own directions©
In planning for Exercise SEA H0BSE 9 the decision was reached
that CIB transportation responsibilities for observers and invited
newsmen would be limited to the objective area and the immediate
vicinity© Long haul transportation arrangements would be made by
the individuals©
Signs 9 in several languages., should be printed and placed on
GIB transportation in order that observers and newsmen may rapidly
ascertain which unit they are assigned to©
In summary9 all transportation angles must be considered©
Any mode p whether it be vehicle^ boat 8 aircraft^ or helicopter 9 will
suffice if it gets the newsmen and observers on the scene and rapidly




It is difficult for an allied information bureau to estimate
with any degree of accuracy the expenditures which will be needed for
its operation. The reason for this is the large number of variables
present which cannot be pinned down until well into the later stages
of planning and operations. Such items as the cost of printing, the
amount of film to be used and processed, entertainment costs, tele-
phone charges, and transportation are most difficult to estimate in
detail* This problem should be understood by those in higher auth-
ority who provide the funds and a contingency reserve should be
granted whenever possible.
^
In order to conserve allocated funds, it has become common
practice for the various area commands to supply office furniture and
other necessary equipment on a loan basis.
On occasion, it becomes necessary for organizations other
than the information bureau to supply services and pay the costs.
In Exercise PONY EXPRESS, as an illustration, the Seventh Fleet
Commander provided funds to perform travel and expenses for the
U.S. GIB members at an estimated cost of $2823o30. Other nations
funded expenses for their representatives to the GIB staff. In
addition, the United Kingdom funded the operation of the sub- GIB
in Singapore. SEATO headquarters, through their GIB representatives,




expended funds and provided equipment for the sub- GIB operations
4,1
in Manila,,
Normally „ CUB expenses can be divided into four categories
s
Publicity material^ administrative supplies$, travel expenses^ and
entertainment o This last category s entertainment 9 is the most diff-
icult to obtain funding forc And it is difficult;, if not almost
impossible^ to receive money specifically to host the press c If the
GIB director believes it is advisable or beneficial to entertain
newsmen,, he normally must squeeze funds from the other categories*.
Even when newsmen are aboard ship to cover an exercise 9 briefing
instructions specify the cost of their meals*
The budget for public relations functions^, thens may become
a major problem for the GIB director,. The logical solution to this
problem is to prepare a budget which takes into consideration as
nearly as possible
s all contingencies which might arise during the
operation,,
Sub-Gomnyffl4 InfformUPR Bureaus
Subordinate information bureaus have been mentioned fre-
quently throughout this chapter,, They are an integral part of the
allied public relations effort and should be established whenever
and wherever necessary,, The GIB director remains in over-all charge
of the sub-information bureaus assisted by subordinate deputies or
directors,.
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It is customary to establish sub-CXBs in the major media out-
let centers and at important operational locations. If the operation
is held entirely at sea, the CIB may be in the flagship of one task
group with a sub- CIB in the flagship of a second task group. Sub-
GIBs ashore usually manage the distribution of information received
from the fleet in the operational area and assist in local arrange-
ments for newsmen and observers. For example, when United States
troops from Okinawa take part in a joint exercise with Chinese troops
in Taiwan, the CIB is initially located in Taipei in order for Chinese
and American information officers to work out advance details to-
gether. A sub- CIB is established in Okinawa at the regular Army head-
quarters and information is passed back and forth as necessary.
Generally, a few days before D-Day, the CIB will move into the exercise
area replacing the sub- CIB which has been preparing for the arrival
of newsmen and observers. As the CIB is inactivated in Taipei, it
is replaced with a sub- CIB which assists in disseminating news re-
leases and answering press queries.
Sub-CIBs are no different from the major information bureau
in relation to detailed plans. These highly important details might
include such items as a power supply ashore for a public address system
to be used during press conferences and briefings. Foresight pre-
cluded this problem during Exercise STEEL PIKE I when sub- CIB per-
sonnel from Seville made an inspection of the assault beach area.
Non-availability of a power supply near the assault area dictated the
use of a field gasoline-operated generator and field portable public

98
address system. Other detailed plans might include the furnishing of
drinking water and food ashore during amphibious exercises 9 making
rain gear and binoculars available for newsmen and observers 9 or
arranging for reporters and observers to use the ship's store for
toiletries and souvenir merchandise <r
It is inevitably true that personnel make the organization,,
This is especially true in a public relations organization such as the
Command Information Bureau,, Personnel who are citizens of different
countries and various military commands will,, for the most part 5
be unknown to each other,. It is imperative that these people lose
little time in forging a hard-working and enthusiastic team which
literally thinks of little else except the allied effort » Only then
will these personnel , upon inactivation of the information bureau.,
experience the same sense of deep personal regret that one feels when
a ship is decommissioned,,
42





War correspondents were regarded a century ago as interlopers in
situations which were the concern exclusively of military men and
government officials. Efforts to restrict the operations of the
correspondents led to an accumulation of experience which grad-
ually formalized the limitations imposed on themp and led govern-
ments either to use the correspondents to bolster up national
policies or actually to absorb them into the army as an import-
ant and legitimate branch of the armed services,,^
More currentlyp military correspondents have been embraced by
alliance organizations to bolster international policies,, The sub-
stantial political and social interest in warfare has brought about
the increased attention to what is written and said about international
defense functions,,
News media coverage of alliance naval exercises is normally
authorized and encouraged,. The broad information objective is to
acquaint the United States and foreign publics with the operational
capabilities and cooperation of alliance defense force s„ To gain the
desired news coverage from media representative
s
s certain basic
characteristics of the international press must be understood by
alliance information personnel.
The press 9 in its efforts to report the news of the world 9 has
1
Ralph 0. Nafziger 9 International jjgyj and -frhe Press (New York?
H Wo Wilson, Coop 194-0) * P» xviio

100
a bearing on the course of world politics and social values to which
people cling. The various ramifications of these effects are sub-
jects which are just beginning to emerge in communication research.
When one considers the number of daily newspapers, the less-frequent-
ly published newspapers, magazines, and other assorted periodical press,
it becomes apparent that the printed media of mass communications have
the potential of great power and influence in creating, stabilizing,
and changing world opinion. And if consideration is given to the
electronic media of radio and television that reach even the illiter-
ates, the communications impact on international thought becomes
2
greatly magnified.
Reporters assigned to cover allied exercises may think of them-
selves as merely informers with a primary responsibility for straight
reporting. These neutral reporters provide information that enables
others to play a part in the fashioning of policy.
Other reporters who observe the exercises may think of them-
selves as interpreters of the events. Their primary job is to per-
ceive and point out the main directions of policy or the failings of
policy. These reporters could well be critics of the governments
involved in the exercise, advocates of alliance policy, or policy
makers themselves trying to influence the opinions of certain nations
and the public.
The Viet-Nam affair demonstrated that foreign correspondents
are able to exercise an entirely independent ability to shape the news
2
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in an open soeiety<>
Browne j, Sheehan sand Halberstam were credited with having helped
change the policies of the U S government in Viet-Nara by their
accurate reporting that the war was being lost at a time when all
officials on the spot were claiming victory,, 8We maintained an
independent position/ Halberstam said, 'While we were sympathet-
ic to the aims of the U,S, government who created a policy of
optimism about the war that simply was not justified,, There was
no choice for us. We had our duty to our newspapers 9 the public
that reads themp and that was to tell the truth, Browne and
Halberstam won a Pulitzer Prize for their work in Viet-Nam,3
A primary duty of alliance information bureau personnel should
be to discover the policy preference of the reporters covering an
exercise and to determine their qualifications in covering defense
matterso Is the reporter a Hanson Baldwin (military specialist for
the New York Times) or a free-lance correspondent with no major
specialization?
Pregg qXtattta
How a reporter covers an allied exercise may be largely deter-
mined by the press climate that prevails in his native country Many
press concepts or theories exist in the world today and often signifi-
cant variations in basic newspaper and magazine types can be observed.
Out of this wide and intricate press design a few ideological patterns
take form and stand out.
The basic concept regarding national press theories may be
stated in the form of a question. Does the press create or lead public
opinion or does it merely follow the lead of government and mirror its
3
John Hohenbergp Foreign Correspondences The Great Reporters
aj&Ltneir Tj.meg (New lorks Columbia University Press, 1 964) p p, 447c
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activities? Wilbur Schramm has classified the world's press systems
into four theories? (1) the authoritarian theory; (2) the communistic
theory; (3) the libertarian theory, and; (4.) the social responsibility
theory,,
The first two of these theories are similar Both are primar-
ily totalitarian in their insistence on control and regimentation of
the press. The press systems of Germany in the 194.0' s and Spain in
the 1950' s are examples of the authoritarian theory In a total-
itarian sense they differ little from the Communistic press system
of the Soviet Union.
The libertarian and the social responsibility theories over-
lap in many respects Most nations which accept the libertarian
theory today consider responsibility of the press to the public a part
of this theory The United States and British press are considered
examples of these theories.
Press practices vary in different sections of the world in
aspects aside from the basic theories,. International news public-
ation may depend on literacy, number of languages within a country
,
production costs, and advertising revenue available,.
The amount of international news used in newspapers throughout
Europe is growing and the typography and makeup of European public-
ations have shown great improvement in recent years Magazines, news-
papers and other periodicals thrive in most parts of the continent,
European newspapers enjoy considerable freedom,, with notable exceptions
4
Wilbur Schramm, Responsibility in Mass Communj,catf j on (New York;
Harper and Row, 1957), p. 61-99,

103
being found in Spain and Portugal , and in the Communist nations of
Eastern Europe.
Latin America does not enjoy the wide newspaper and magazine
readerships found in Europe, In the larger Latin American cities,
there are large dailies, slick magazines, competing television stations,
and radio networks « But the hinterlands tell a different story The
"average" Latin American still lives in a town or village with a
population of less than 2,500j has six years of schooling at best
or more often one year - or none« "If his town has a newspaper, it
is a weekly or small daily with a few thousand circulation, poorly-
printed, without much world news, and not enough advertising revenue
to improve,"
Since World War II, newspapers in Asia, and particularly in
Southeast Asia, have grown rapidly. Aside from Japan, the papers are
generally small but they have done much to instill a spirit of nation-
alism. The Southeast Asian press constantly attacks anything that
smacks of colonialism and makes no secret of pro-communist and pro-
Soviet Union sentiments. Still the press of Southeast Asia is hamper-
7
ed by a low literacy rate and the great number of languages.
Some idea of the prevailing press climate is essential to
members of the allied bureau because information directed to foreign
audiences is usually best conveyed via national news channels.
5









Although information is best conveyed by national news channels,
press service and network representatives are usually accorded first
priority in allied exercise publicity. The reason for this priority
is simple. International news agencies supply the bulk of the foreign
news to newspapers (and many magazines) all over the world. In the
Command Information Bureau, however, each participating nation should
have a minimum of one press billet.
There are three main foreign news sources used by the press
of the world. They are news agencies, syndicates, and staff corres-
pondents of newspapers. The news agencies account for more than three-
fourths of the news transmitted internationally. The largest providers
of international news are the five world agencies which have their
communications network spread around the globe - the Associated Press
and the United Press International (U.S.); Reuters (Great Britain)
j
Agence France-Presse (France) j and TASS (Soviet Union) . Together
these five agencies serve at least 150 nations and territories which
have more than nine-tenths of the world's total population.
Because of the role of government in determining the affairs
and destinies of nations, the press is dependent on government for a
major portion of its most significant news. The military, being an
8
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arm of government, is an ever present source of interest to the press
In fact, the bulk of the international news flow is made up of political
,
military, and foreign relations items.
Military operations and exercises naturally suggest some kind
of conflicto The conflict may be between the allies themselves (the
United States and France feigning conflict in NATO exercises) or
between ideological groups (the United States in support of South Viet-
Nam) The ingredient of conflict ma^es a press story in the inter-
national field. "The major story in the foreign policy field is like
the major story in any field - the principal ingredient is conflict.
The relative unambiguity of contention as a source of news may even be
the reason for its prominence , both in the reporters' minds and in the
news columns.
"
Exercise TEAM WORK is an excellent example of how conflict,
whether desired or not, can add impetus to an allied exercise. The
presence of Soviet ships and aircraft in the exercise area caused
considerable interest among the press. The embarked media represent-
atives had a first hand picture of all encounters and were able to file
a personal account of Soviet units operating in the area.
To insure that media interest is aroused in an important exercise,
the earliest possible contact with the news media is essential. The
over-all plans of the information bureau depend, to a great extent, on
exactly which media will be represented. Personal contacts are helpful
9
Bernard Cecil Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy (Princetons
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if they can be effected,, If not, then personal correspondence is
required,, It should be noted that many media personnel are accustomed
to establishing contacts by telephone,,
Media Representative Requirements
According to the top-ranking newsmen and former war corres-
pondents who covered the International Naval Review in 1957, the
three thumb-rules for handling the press ares Transportation, Gomm-
10
unications, and Accommodations., Since these topics were covered in
Chapter IV, the following discussion centers on other media requirements,
Members of the press need information,, Realizing that caution
must be exercised to safeguard the classified aspects of exercises,
certain non-classified information is sometimes difficult to obtain,,
Military agencies (national or allied) are famous for their division
of authority and responsibility and information officers have diff-
iculty in determining who has the authority to give certain infor-
mation„ He may also have difficulty in locating someone who will
accept the responsibility for releasing the information to the infor-
mation bureau,. Some administrators are reluctant to talk,,
Exercise BIG LIFT, a combined U S Army and Air Force NATO
exercise
s
presented a problem within the information bureau when "key"
personnel interviews had not been planned for„ This excerpt from the
10
Report of Command Information Bureau 21 - International Naval
jfflflffik June 12, 1957* p„ 38„
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exercise critique sums up the problems
The Press Branch and the Radio-TV Branch wanted to do interviews
with 'key 9 Army and Air Force personnel involved in BIG LIFTo List
of personnel available for interviews was not readily available or
published, A great many possible features were lost due to not
having the information available,
RecQfflmeA4atJQQ - A list of available subjects should be compiled
and distributed to each press section. List should include name
and place of contact,''
2
In order for a public information bureau to act as such, it
must first get early and accurate information to disseminate. This
requires an extremely close and personal liaison with other agenciesj,
that possess or will possess , such information. It further requires
that the information group constantly and energetically seek out the
information it needs. This can be a most difficult and often frust-
rating task, requiring a maximum of tact, patience, courtesy, and good
personal relationships. Sporadic news cannot establish and maintain
the continuing media interest necessary for an important event.
Another important press requirement is equal access to infor-
mation. There should be no preferential treatment accorded any one
media group. In this regard, news media representatives, who are
nationals of allied nations, should be accorded the same privileges
and services that are given to American correspondents. Discriminatory
treatment among national press groups, whether real or imagined, can
13be prejudicial to the allied information bureau.
12
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There is no one best way to prepare for the requirements of
newsmen,, Each correspondent is different and each must be accommodated
in a different manner,. In some cases, reporters prefer to go their own
way with a minimum of assistance „ Others expect bureau personnel to
accommodate them the entire exercise period,,
To make media representatives' visits to allied exercises as
enlightening and productive as possible 9 the fine art of public re-
lations must be employed* Press relations involves a delicate choice
between providing accommodations that make the reporter' s visit pro-
fitable to the information bureau as well as to himself and over-





In the international public relations field, mutual under-
standing and respect is the primary goalo An effective information
bureau during allied naval operations is a valuable tool in achieving
this major goalo If the bureau is properly conducted , old rivalries
die
s
new friendships germinate, and a new understanding grows among
nations often widely separated, not only in distance one from another,
but also in history and tradition.
By way of summary, this final chapter is concerned with re-
commendations for improving public relations during allied naval ex-
ercises and operations,, These recommendations are based on research,
correspondence with experienced U S Naval information officers, and
reports of Command Information Bureau operations,,
Pgr^ona] fowigifog
No matter how effective an information program may be, there
is no substitute for qualified personnel. The United States is judged
abroad by the actions of its people more than by words „ Words may
help a people to understand action, but they are no substitute for the
personality factors necessary for successful overseas duty.
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The following recommendations are listed as a guideline for
assigning Naval personnel to an allied information bureau. Certainly,
no one person would possess all these qualities and skills; however,
careful consideration of them would be helpful in strengthening the
information bureau operation.
Flexibility is an essential personality characteristic for
successful work overseas. The person who works abroad for long periods
of time should be able to easily adapt his personal and work habits
to a different environment. Allied bureau personnel must be cog-
nizant of the non-verbal language which exists and the possibility
of experiencing culture shock. A sound sense of humor aids in accept-
ing criticism and enduring the inevitable frustrations that arise
within the bureau.
Sensitivity to other people (empathy) assists in the search
for the assumptions and approaches which make another people's way
of life different. The avoidance of forming stereotypes, understanding
national pride,, and the willingness to compromise administrative style
are traits to be cultivated. Healthy curiosity coupled with an interest
in why people act the way they act is desirable.
Skills
Experience in international relations is highly desirable for
bureau personnel j especially experience in working with the specific
alliance countries involved in an exercise. Although geographic
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specialization is not always feasible in the Navy, nothing can replace
the knowledge gained from previous relationships with foreign nationals,,
A talent for teamwork as well as a talent for directing, train-
ings and evaluating subordinate personnel contributes to maintaining
a productive and efficient information bureau,. The ability to recommend
a decision is an essential skill for key bureau personnel; particularly
in the planning stages of an exercise
„
Clear expression without the benefit of jargon, both orally
and in written form, alleviates the language problem,, dear, concise,
and logical communication must be the order of the day in bureau
operations,,
Foreign language ability is an invaluable aid in gaining the




The following guidelines for the effective allied information
bureau emphasize the more salient points discussed in Chapters III,
IV, and Vo
All participating nations should be represented in the Command
Information Bureau Adherence to relative rank is not always the best
way to perform the public relations task G Special consideration must
be given to an officer's title and particular information specialty,,
The public relations objectives of the information bureau must
be agreed upon by all participating nations,,
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The selection of the allied bureau director should be based on
his familiarity with the working press involved and his familiarity
with the type of naval operation being conducted,,
The GIB organization must specify exact assignments of tasks
and authority,. Protocol functions should be separated from news media
functions* Gare should be taken not to overstaff or over-organize the
bureau. Consideration may be given to assigning a supply officer or
communications technical officer to the bureau for functions not with-
in the information officer's specialty.
In the planning stages 9 insure that the exercise commander
recognizes the vital importance of the public relations mission. Public
relations planning must be made in conjunction with operational plan-
ning. The realistic training value of exercise bureau operations
should be emphasized.
Tactics
The location of the Command Information Bureau should be as
close as possible to the exercise scene of action. The location must
be equipped with the necessary physical facilities for proper bureau
operation. Sub-CIBs should be established in the operational area's
major media outlet centers and important operational locations.
USIS assistance to the CIB can be a valuable aid.
Information is the most important aspect of the allied bureau.
Bureau personnel must establish early liaison with officers that are
responsible for releasing information. Equal access to information must
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be afforded all media representatives,,
Press and observer briefings should be given before, during,
and after the operation*.
Press Kits should be prepared well in advance of the exercise,.
They should be completely functional
„
Particular attention must be devoted to photography,, Personnel,
equipment, and rapid transportation must be provided,,
Adequate and reliable communications equipment must be avail-
able,, Priorities for the use of this equipment should be made known
to the invited media prior to the operation,, Facilities for receiving
world news should be available to newsmen,,
All forms of transportation (vehicle, boat, aircraft, and heli-
copter) for press and observer conveyance must be considered,,
Funds for the bureau operation should be estimated, if possible,,
Publicity material, administrative supplies, travel expenses, and
entertainment should be included in the budget,,
Conclusion,
This study has attempted to emphasize the importance of public
relations in allied operations and exercises,. If an allied operation'
s
public relations aspects are poorly conducted and mis-handled, misunder-
standing and distrust could easily develop,,
A Command Information Bureau is established for allied operations
to insure that public relations is effectively conducted,, The success
of the GIB, unfortunately, is never guaranteed,, Hopefully, this study
has brought to light some of the pitfalls that have in the past and
could in the future plague an allied information organization,,

1U
Military strength alone cannot achieve the United States' fore-
most objective - the defense of the free world against Communist aggress-
ion,, To win the confidence and support of the free world, the United
States must also have its aims and policies understood. If the publics
of alliance nations are not told of the contribution their forces, and
their allies are making to collective security, then allied cooperation
so necessary for a strong defense will be hindered,
"Public sentiment is everything; with public sentiment, nothing
can fail; without it, nothing can succeed. He who molds opinion is
greater than he who enacts laws," These words, spoken by Abraham
Lincoln, succinctly describe the mission of allied public relations,
A properly conducted public relations program by an effective allied
information bureau, during a naval exercise, will contribute greatly
to this public support.
1
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APPENDIX
SAMPLE PUBLIC INFORMATION ANNEX
FOR AN ALLIED EXERCISE

SAMPLE PUBLIC INFORMATION ANNEX FOR AN ALLIED EXERCISE
1o Mission* This organization is established to:
a n Bring the United States into a closer, more efficient relation-
ship for mutual defense, to create confidence and understanding among
each participants and to increase the prestige and understanding of each
country,. To this end, joint sponsorship and participation will be
stressed,
bo Serve to acquaint observers and newsmen with the operating
capabilities, equipment, and military proficiency of participating
(alliance) forces; and
c, Plan, coordinate, and implement public information activities
in order to keep the public informed of the nature, scope, and
significance of the exercise,
2, Organization.
a» Public Information and Protocol for the exercise will be con-
trolled by the Officer-in- Charge, Command Information Bureau (01 C, GIB)
who shall be directly responsible to the exercise commander in assur-
ing that all facets of CIB activity are carried out,
bo The CIB will consist of a Public Information Branch and a
Protocol Branch, organized to allow separate handling of news and
protocol matters as appropriate , The two branches will otherwise
work in close coordination with one another,. Other components will
consist of a Mobile Photo Team, and Escort Branch,
Co Direct liaison between ships, embarked commands, and partici-
pating units with the CIB is authorizedo Releasing authority for
all news material will be retained by the Officer-in-Charge, Command
Information Bureau, unless specifically delegated,
d. The CIB will maintain a record file of press releases, A
file of news clippings from local, national and international news
media will be maintained by the CIB and each Sub- CIB, Each clipping
will have the following information appended? Name of media in which
it appeared, date of appearance, and page number. All news releases
will be written and released in the English language and any require-
ments for translation to another language will be the responsibility
of the country requiring the translation.
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e Invitations to news representatives to attend this exercise
will be issued in the name of the co-sponsor nations, after consult-
ation with the host nation and member nations,. To provide for
coordinated representation, sponsoring nations should forward a list
of representatives to be invited to the GIB for comments and suggest-
ions* The CIB may also be authorized by the sponsoring nations to
issue invitations on their behalf Consistent with the security of
the exercise, invitations should be issued sufficiently in advance
to enable news agencies to plan their coverage
»
3o News Release Policy-
ao Initial press release.
(1) The Public Information Office, in consultation with the
Military Planning Office, will prepare a draft of the initial press
release and publication guidance
»
(2) All public information releases will be made by the CIB„
Participating commands and units will submit all information to the
CIBo The initial press release will be drafted by the CIB and submit-
ted to the exercise commander
(3) Subsequent releases will contain background information
concerning the participating units and all major events covered in the
exercise and will be handled by the exercise director through the CIB
(4) Participating commands and units are invited to submit
newsworthy press material by priority message to the CIB The CIB will
be informed immediately of any accident, actual injury to personnel
or significant material damage
(5) The CIB will provide for Fleet Hometown News Center cover-
age and unit participation in this programo
a A CIB briefing team will be composed of senior operational
officers representing the participating units
bo The schedule of press conferences and briefings will be
promulgated at a later date»
Co During the exercise ashore, escorted press and observers will




do A press conference will be held on the morning before sailing
at the Sub-GIB ashore,. Senior commanders will be invited to attend.
e A post exercise briefing will be held aboard the GIB flagship
prior to the departure of newsmen and observers c
5o Invitations to Press and Observers.
a Invitations will be coordinated by 01 C- GIB on behalf of the
sponsoring nations,
6. Specific Responsibilities..
a. The Public Information Division will?
(1) Promulgate public information policy for the operation
as determined by the exercise commander,,
(2) Issue special instructions to public information officers
of units participating in the operation,,
(3) Coordinate photographic coverage for publicity purposes
and supervise filming by the Navy photo team.
U) Coordinate with USIS ( ) and USIS ( ) on matters
of mutual interest
o
(5) Arrange for special publicity features when practical.
(6) Arrange for transmission of press copy.
(7) Coordinate the transportation of news representatives and
official observers with the Protocol Division.
(8) Arrange for press briefings^, conferences, and receptions.
b. The Protocol Division wills
(1) Coordinate the handling of observers (including VTP's)
and issue special protocol instructions as required.
(2) Insure that the ships in which newsmen and official
observers are embarked arrange for billeting and messing of said
newsmen and official observers.




(4) Coordinate on special protocol matters
(5) Arrange for interpreters as feasible and appropriate,,
Co The Briefing Team will give presentations 9 classified or




o Official press releases will be of appropriate
precedence and released only by the OXG=GIBo No release is required
for news media press release So
80 Courier ^ Couriers will be provided at both the CIB and Sub- GIB
to insure expedient and proper handling of news release
s
a<> The exercise will be covered photographically by a United
States Naval Mobile Photographic Unito
bo Commands to which photographers are assigned should insure
that photos are newsworthyp of a public information nature^ and that
complete captions accompany photographs forwarded to the GIB,
Co The exercise will be photographically covered with l6/35mm
black and white and color motion pictures and black and white and
color still pictures by units specifiedo
a It is not planned to billet any guestsj however s if any
berthing or messing is required^ the U S and others participating
units will be responsible for the observers and newsmen of their
respective countries
bo A small number of guests may be accommodated afloat if the
need arises
a Newsmen embarked will mess in the wardrooms of the assigned





a It is planned that GIB transportation responsibilities for
observers and invited news media representatives will be limited to
the objective area and the immediate vicinity, with long haul trans-
portation arrangements made by individuals or by higher authority,,
bo GIB identification armbands will be available for all
personnel in the CIB organization, and members of the press This
will be a necessary item in order to distinguish CIB personnel from
participants in the exercise
Co GIB signs to identify boats, helicopters, and vehicles will
be printed and carried to the exercise area
d„ Typewriters from staff offices will be made available to
reporters in the established press room aboard the CIB ship c
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